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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Nazmul Islam 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mihaela I. Pintea, Major Professor 
This dissertation includes three essays on empirical studies of macroeconomic 
analysis of development. The first and second chapter focus on defining different 
categories of households based on the type of wealth they hold, deriving their 
demographic characteristics and how they react to transitory income shocks. The 
economics literature splits households into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), wealthy hand-
to-mouth (W-HtM), and not hand-to-mouth (N-HtM). This breakdown is important to 
accurately capture how different categories of households react to income shocks.  
In Chapter 1, I argue that this classification is missing important features related 
to the behavior of indebted households. Thus, novel in the literature, I define a new 
category of households: the indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM), those that hold no 
net liquid assets (cash, checking, savings accounts etc.) and are indebted in illiquid 
wealth (negative net value of illiquid wealth defined as a negative net mortgage value that 
is not offset by positive illiquid assets such as private retirement accounts). I identify the 
share of such households in the United States, their demographic characteristics, their 
portfolio composition, and the persistence of their status over their life cycle. In the 
literature, they assimilate into the P-HtM households that hold neither net liquid nor net 
 vii 
illiquid assets. However, I show that the age profile of IP-HtM households by 
demographic characteristics demonstrates almost the same pattern as W-HtM households 
that do not hold liquid assets but own sizable amounts of illiquid wealth.  
In the second chapter, I perform a detailed analysis of how various items of 
consumption such as food, nonfood, durable, nondurable, social sector, healthcare, 
utilities and education expenditure respond to transitory income shocks. The IP-HtM 
exhibits the highest marginal propensity to consume among all categories of households, 
for most consumption items. This implies that the stimulatory government’s policies are 
the most effective for the IP-HtMs. This research can help governments design and 
execute their fiscal policies targeting the highest stimulatory effect during recessions. 
 In the third chapter, I use a 2013 survey of rickshaw pullers in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh to identify the determinants of their households’ healthcare expenditure using 
a flexible Box-Cox model regression method. The results suggest that income, distance of 
residence from healthcare center/hospital, age of household head, and duration of illness 
episode are the main determinants of healthcare utilization. The income elasticity of 
about 0.55 signals the tendency for healthcare to behave like a normal and necessary 
good. Since healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs” theory of economic 
development, the way healthcare expenditure in a resource-constrained community 
responds to changes in income level and other factors is particularly relevant to 
development policy. Working-class populations in developing countries have unmet 
healthcare needs, and effective policies and programs are needed to ensure that healthcare 
services are received in a timely manner.   
 viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three distinct yet related essays. All three essays 
are focused on empirical studies of macroeconomic analysis of development. In 
particular, I focus on the analysis of different characteristics of resource constrained 
households and how they react to various economic shocks. In the first two essays, I use 
data from the United States households for defining different groups of resource 
constrained households on the basis of the type of wealth they hold, deriving their 
demographic characteristics and their consumption reaction to transitory income shocks. 
In the third essay, I use a survey of a resource constrained community from a developing 
country, Bangladesh, to determine the factors that affect their households’ healthcare 
expenditure.  
In the first essay, I define a new category of households, the indebted poor hand-
to-mouth (IP-HtM), and analyze its characteristics in relation to other types of 
households. Currently, the economics literature splits households into different categories 
depending on the type of wealth they hold (Kaplan & Violante, 2010; Kaplan, Violante, 
& Weidner, 2014). The categories of wealth under consideration are net liquid wealth, 
which is the difference between liquid assets (checking and savings accounts, stocks, 
bonds, etc.) and liquid debts (student loans, credit cards, etc.) and net illiquid wealth (net 
value of mortgages, private retirement accounts, etc.). According to this classification, 
hand-to-mouth (HtM) households are split into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), those that 
hold little or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth; wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM), 
those that hold no liquid wealth but sizable amounts of illiquid wealth; and not hand-to-
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mouth (N-HtM), those that hold both liquid and illiquid wealth. This breakdown is 
important to accurately capture how different categories of households react to income 
shocks.  
I argue that this classification is missing important features related to the behavior 
of indebted households and further split the P-HtM households into two different 
subcategories that lack definition and separate analysis in the economics literature. First, I 
define indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM) as the group of households that hold 
negative net illiquid wealth. Second, I define not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIP-
HtM) as those households that do not hold any illiquid wealth. Using the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, I find 
that about 0.6 percent to 1.4 percent of total households (more than 3 million people) in 
the United States are IP-HtM and have debts in illiquid wealth (negative net illiquid 
wealth). This number increases to about 3 percent during the Great Recession of 2008-
2009, followed by a decrease during the recovery period. In addition, on average about 6 
percent of the P-HtM households are IP-HtM, and the rest are NIP-HtM. Moreover, in the 
PSID data, the maximum share of IP-HtM households is White with a geographical 
concentration in the southern portion of the United States. 
I show that the age profile of IP-HtMs by demographic characteristics exhibits 
almost the same pattern as W-HtM. This suggests that one cannot assimilate IP-HtM 
households into the P-HtM group. However, this group does not fit into the category of 
W-HtM households either since the portfolio composition of the indebted household is 
dissimilar to that of the W-HtM. Therefore, IP-HtM households warrant their own 
distinct status and behavior analysis in the literature.  
3 
 
If the first essay focused on the definition and description of the demographic 
characteristics of IP-HtM, the second essay focuses on the analysis of the behavior of 
these households.  In the second essay, I describe how total consumption and different 
items of consumption such as food, nonfood, durable and nondurable goods of IP-HtM 
households react to a transitory income change. Moreover, I discuss the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) for the social sector, healthcare, education, and utilities, 
which are different components of nonfood items. I use a longitudinal data set that 
includes information on income, consumption, and liquid and illiquid wealth at the 
household level that is necessary to estimate the MPCs. I use the 9 waves of pooled data 
(1999–2015) from the PSID survey on the United States household portfolios.  
Using the methodology proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), 
Kaplan and Violante (2010), and Kaplan et al. (2014), I estimate the consumption 
response to transitory changes in income. Unlike these studies, I use the updated sample 
periods with enriched data, estimate the transmission coefficients of income shocks to 
consumption for IP-HtM households, and find the MPCs separately for other types of 
HtM households. These two empirical analyses differentiate this study from Blundell et 
al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014). 
In data, results show that in the baseline specification, MPC of the total 
consumption for the IP-HtM households is 0.97. However, it is 0.42, 0.23, 0.48, 0.71, and 
0.62 for nondurable, durable, nonfood, food, and utilities, respectively. In comparing 
these results to the responses of P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households, I find that 
the consumption of IP-HtM households is the most responsive (highest MPC) for all 
consumption items except durables, health care, and social sector expenditure in the 
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baseline specification. This suggests that the government can obtain the maximum 
effectiveness of its stimulatory policies for the IP-HtM households. This study can help 
government design and execute the fiscal policies directing the highest stimulatory effect 
during economic slowdown. 
In the third essay, I investigate the determinants of healthcare expenditure of a 
resource-constrained community using flexible Box-Cox model regression methods and 
cross-sectional micro-level household data. Resource-constrained households like those 
of working-class population live from hand to mouth, and they spend a large share of 
their earnings on their basic needs. They do not have enough money to pay for the 
necessary healthcare services. They might decrease their healthcare spending if there is 
any rise in out-of-pocket payment on healthcare expenditures, and even small 
copayments might reduce the possibility of receiving required healthcare. Healthcare 
providers can provide services more effectively to such low-income households, like 
those of day labors, if they know the factors of healthcare spending among this group of 
households.  
For this study, I use a 2013 survey of rickshaw pullers (RP) in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. Considering their poor social and economic status, type of service to the 
economy, lack of access to high-quality healthcare, lack of human and physical capital, 
and so on, RP represent a resource-constrained community in a developing country.  
I find that income, distance of residence from healthcare center/hospital, age of 
household head, and duration of illness episode are the significant factors of healthcare 
utilization for a resource-constrained community. The healthcare income elasticity of 
about 0.55 implies that healthcare is like a normal and necessary good. How healthcare 
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expenditure in this community reacts to changes in income level and other determinants 
is also relevant to health policy because healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs” 
theory of economic development. This group of populations in developing countries have 
unmet healthcare needs. This study discusses the implications for sustainable basic 
healthcare development policies for the marginalized households in society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE INDEBTED HAND-TO-MOUTH 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The economics literature splits households into different categories depending on 
the type of wealth they hold (Kaplan & Violante 2010; Kaplan, Violante, & Weidner 
2014). The categories of wealth under consideration are net liquid wealth, which is the 
difference between liquid assets (checking and savings accounts, stocks, bonds etc.) and 
liquid debts (student loans, credit cards etc.) and net illiquid wealth (net value of 
mortgages, private retirement accounts etc.). According to this classification, hand-to-
mouth (HtM) households are split into poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), those that hold little 
or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth, wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM) those that 
hold no liquid wealth but sizable amounts of illiquid wealth, and not hand-to-mouth (N-
HtM) households, those that hold both liquid and illiquid wealth. This breakdown is 
important to accurately capture how different categories of households react to income 
shocks.  
I argue that this classification is missing important features related to the behavior 
of indebted households and further split the P-HtM households into two different 
subcategories that lack definition and separate analysis in the economics literature. First, I 
define indebted poor hand-to-mouth (IP-HtM) as the group of households that hold 
negative net illiquid wealth.1 Second, I define not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIP-
HtM) as those households that do not hold any illiquid wealth.  
                                                 
1 Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2018) show that focusing on housing as the main illiquid 
assets, contrary to what standard models of strategic default would imply, nearly all very low equity 
borrowers remain current on their payments, and therefore preserve their illiquid assets. This finding 
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I find that in terms of demographic characteristics, IP-HtMs are more similar to 
W-HtM than to P-HtM households, the category into which they currently fall in the 
literature. This suggests that one cannot integrate IP-HtM households into the P-HtM 
group. On the other hand, this group does not fit into the category of W-HtM households 
since the portfolio composition of the indebted household is quite different from that of 
the W-HtM. Therefore, it makes more sense not to integrate the IP-HtM households into 
either the P-HtM or the W-HtM households; rather, IP-HtM households deserve their 
own separate status and behavior analysis in the literature.  
I compiled pooled information from the Household Dataset for the period of 
1989-2016 at the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) during the course of my research 
from 2016 through 2018.  During that same period, I collected pooled data from the 
Household and Individual Dataset for the period of 1999-2015 at the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). I used the SCF 10 waves of pooled data (1989–2016) of the 
United States to document the share of IP-HtM households and analyze demographic 
characteristics, and the portfolio composition of IP-HtM households. I used the 9 waves 
of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID to observe the share of IP-HtM on the basis of 
race and geographical location, and the persistence of IP-HtM status over household life 
cycle. 
Using the SCF and the PSID data, I find that about 0.6 percent to 1.4 percent of 
total households (more than 3 million people) in the United States are IP-HtM, and have 
debts in illiquid wealth (negative net illiquid wealth). This number increases to about 3 
                                                                                                                                                 
includes about 80 percent of households that need to cut their consumption to subsistence levels to make 
their mortgage payments.  
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percent during the Great Recession of 2008-2009, followed by a decrease during 
recovery. In addition, on average about 6 percent of the P-HtM households are IP-HtM 
and the rest are NIP-HtM. Moreover, in the PSID data, the maximum share of IP-HtM 
households is White with a geographical concentration in the southern portion of the 
United States.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the 
literature review, section three discusses the selected the sample and identifies IP-HtM 
households in the data, section four identifies the share of IP-HtM households in the 
United States data, section five explores demographics and portfolio composition of IP-
HtM, section six shows the share of IP-HtM households based on race and regions in 
PSID Data, section seven describes the status persistence of IP-HtM households, and the 
final section concludes.  
1.2   Literature Review 
 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Huggett (1996), Aiyagari (1994), Ríos-Rull 
(1995), and Krusell and Smith (1998) used data on net worth to determine HtM behavior. 
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015), Eggertson and Krugman (2012), and Gali, 
Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), among others, used this type of model to study 
macroeconomic dynamics around the Great Recession.  
Kaplan et al. (2014) claimed that using data on net worth to estimate HtM 
behavior is misleading as this oversights what they call the W-HtM households, that is, 
households that have significant amounts of net worth or positive assets, but in an illiquid 
form. This is also supported by Cui and Feng (2017).  They documented that nearly 17 
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percent of households in China are HtM, among them 10 percent are P-HtM and 90 
percent are W-HtM. They also claimed that HtM in China mostly consist of the W-HtM, 
who would be ignored by the traditional net worth measure.  
A two-asset model (liquid asset and illiquid asset) developed by Kaplan et al. 
(2014) instead of using net worth to characterize a more complex dimension of HtM 
behavior. The illiquid asset pays a higher interest rate, but requires a transaction cost for 
access. Two-asset models were also used by Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and 
Weinberg (2001), Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003), Chetty and Szeidl (2007), 
Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2012), Huntley and Michelangeli (2014), and Kaplan and 
Violante (2014a, 2014b).  
Within the scope of this two-asset model, Kaplan et al. (2014) identified the N-
HtM as those households that have positive liquid assets and two other types of HtM 
households. The P-HtM households have little or no liquid wealth and no illiquid wealth. 
The W-HtM counterparts also have little or no liquid wealth; however, they hold 
substantial volumes of illiquid assets. Even though W-HtM have positive assets and thus 
a positive net worth that makes them similar to N-HtM, they have a high MPC and lack 
the ability to exercise consumption smoothing similar to the P-HtM households. 
Therefore, Kaplan et al. (2014) argued that it is impossible to completely integrate W-
HtM into either group and that W-HtM requires identification as a separate category of 
households for the purpose of economic analysis.  They used the SCF and PSID for 
United States household data to identify the different types of HtM households. Their 
estimates indicate that, on average, 31 percent of United States households are HtM. Of 
these, approximately 10 percent are P-HtM and the rest are W-HtM. They found the 
10 
 
similarity among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in their overall 
share of HtM households and the breakdown between P-HtM and W-HtM. Among the 
euro area countries, the fraction of HtM in Germany is closer to 30 percent; however, 
France, Italy, and Spain have around 20 percent of HtM households. On the other hand, 
the total share of HtM in Australia is roughly half the fraction in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada. Also, 90 percent of Australia’s HtM households are W-
HtM. All the eight countries in their study, there are more W-HtM than P-HtM 
households. This share exceeds two third for the euro area countries.  
Park (2017) found that the shares of N-HtM, W-HtM, and P-HtM households are 
64.0 percent, 32.2 percent, and 3.8 percent respectively in South Korea. Hara, Unayama, 
and Weidner (2016) documented HtM households and studied their characteristics in 
Japanese data. They showed that the share of HtM is about 13 percent, which is much 
smaller than other developed countries and nearly one-quarter of them are considered as 
P-HtM and rest of them are W-HtM. 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
I use the method developed by Kaplan et al. (2014) to identify the different 
categories of HtM households and analyze their behavior and, thus, assume that the 
available savings instruments are a liquid asset (M) and an illiquid one (A).  
 Kaplan et al. (2014) defined a household, as N-HtM if it holds a positive amount 
of liquid and illiquid wealth: M > 0 and A ≥ 0; as P-HtM if it does not hold any liquid or 
illiquid wealth: M ≤ 0 and A ≤ 0; and as W-HtM if it holds a sizable amount of illiquid 
wealth but no liquid wealth: M = 0 and A > 0.  
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 I split P-HtM into two HtM groups: IP-HtM and NIP-HtM and define a 
household as IP-HtM if it has a negative amount of net illiquid wealth, A < 0; and as 
NIP-HtM if it holds zero net illiquid wealth, A = 0. 
 Let Ykt denote the income of household k in pay-period t, Akt denotes holdings of 
illiquid assets, and Mkt denotes average balances of liquid wealth over the pay periods. I 
follow the definitions of W-HtM and P-HtM households as used in Kaplan et al. (2014) 
and assume that resources are consumed at a constant rate and define non-credit 
constrained households as those whose average liquid wealth balances are positive (they 
do not borrow) but are equal to or less than half their earning per pay-period.   
In this case a household is W-HtM if  
Akt > 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
                              (1.1) 
A household is P-HtM if  
Akt ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
                       (1.2)  
I further use the criterion to identify the more minute categories of P-HtM.  
A household is IP-HtM if 
Akt < 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
                       (1.3) 
and a household is NIP-HtM if 
Akt = 0 and 0 ≤ Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
                       (1.4) 
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As shown in Kaplan et al. (2014), the estimator on the number of HtM is a lower 
bound because some HtM household might hold, on average, liquid balances above half 
their earnings.2  
I now consider the HtM household at the credit limit − Mkt < 0 so that it 
consumes all its cash-on-hand for the period, plus all its available credit.  Credit limit 
refers to the maximum amount of credit financial institutions extend to a household 
through a line of credit as well as the maximum amount credit card companies allow a 
household to spend on cards.  
A household is W-HtM if 
Akt > 0, Mkt ≤ 0   and   Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
 − Mkt                      (1.5) 
A household is P-HtM if 
 Akt ≤ 0, Mkt ≤ 0   and   Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
 − Mkt                                                                                      (1.6) 
I use the criterion to identify an IP-HtM household if 
Akt < 0, Mkt ≤ 0   and   Mkt ≤  
𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
 − Mkt                     (1.7)  
I identify a NIP-HtM household if  
Akt = 0, Mkt ≤ 0   and   Mkt ≤  
 𝑌𝑘𝑡
2
  − Mkt                      (1.8)  
I identify in the data the different categories of households: the W-HtM 
households by combining (1.1) and (1.5), the P-HtM by combining (1.2) and (1.6), the 
IP-HtM by combining (1.3) and (1.7), and NIP-HtM by combining (1.4) and (1.8).  
Using the SCF’s ten waves (1989- 2016) I identify the IP-HtM households in the 
United States starting with the core SCF sample and drop households whose income is 
                                                 
2 A household can start a period with liquid savings, earn a certain income and end the period with zero 
liquid assets. This household is HtM, but by the criterion used is counted as N-HtM.  
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negative and those for which all income comes from self-employment and keep 
households where the head is 22–79 years old. The final sample has 39,395 observations 
over the pooled 10 sample years. The SCF survey is triennial. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
survey years used in the sample selection and the final sample sizes. In selecting the 
definition of income, I include all labor income, any government transfers that are regular 
inflows of liquid assets. Because of their irregular perception, I exclude interest, 
dividends, and other capital income. The definitions of income, liquid assets, liquid debts, 
and net illiquid wealth are set forth in Table 1.2. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus 
liquid debts.  
Table 1.3 provides some descriptive statistics on household income, liquid and 
illiquid wealth holdings, and portfolio composition based on the pooled 1989-2016 SCF 
data. The typical household portfolio structure consists of liquid wealth in the form of 
bank accounts and illiquid wealth in the form of housing equity and private retirement 
accounts. The median holdings of other financial assets such as directly held stocks, 
bonds, and life insurance are zero everywhere. Guiso, Halassios, and Jappelli (2002) 
derived similar results in their empirical studies of household portfolios. Housing equity 
forms most of illiquid wealth for households. About 50 percent of households have 
positive private retirement wealth and around 26 percent of households hold positive life 
insurance.  
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of liquid wealth to monthly income considering 
the pooled 1989-2016 SCF data. It shows that the ratio is 0 for about 4 percent of the 
households and about 2.5 for 6.25 percent of the households in the United States. 
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1.4 The Share of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households                                                                                                             
I base my estimation of IP-HtM on Equations (1.3) and (1.7). In the benchmark 
analysis, the pay frequency was set to two weeks and the household credit limit was set to 
one month of income.  
Figure 1.2(a) explores the fraction of HtM households in the United States 
population over the period 1989–2016 in SCF data and depicts the split between IP-HtM, 
NIP-HtM, and W-HtM. Estimates report that, on average, 0.6 percent of the United States 
households were IP-HtM until the 2008-2009 Great Recession. It rose to about 2 percent 
during the recession and started to fall during the recovery periods after 2010. Figure 
1.2(a) also shows that IP-HtM was about 6 percent of the P-HtM before the recession and 
the proportion increased to around 14 percent during the recession. The share of IP-HtM 
in P-HtM started to fall after 2010 and again reached to around 6 percent in 2015. The 
share of all HtM households increased during the recession.  
Figures 1.2(b), 1.2(c), and 1.2(d) focus on the illiquid portfolio3 distribution (only 
housing wealth, other illiquid but no housing wealth4, both other and housing wealth) 
(Table 1.2) of the different categories of HtM. Figure 1.2(b) plots the share of IP-HtM 
households that own housing, non-housing illiquid wealth, or both. About 90 percent of 
IP-HtM households have both, around 10 percent have positive housing but no 
nonhousing illiquid wealth, and no household has only nonhousing illiquid wealth. Figure 
1.2(c) shows that almost all NIP-HtM households have only nonhousing illiquid wealth, 
however overall their net illiquid wealth is zero. Figure 1.2(d) shows that around 28 
                                                 
3 Here only illiquid assets (no illiquid debts) are under consideration in portfolio composition analysis. 
 
4 All other components of illiquid wealth except housing. 
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percent of W-HtM households have both housing wealth and other types of illiquid 
wealth, about 27 percent have positive housing but no nonhousing illiquid wealth, and 
approximately 45 percent have only nonhousing illiquid wealth.  Not surprisingly, I 
notice the highest share of W-HtM with both housing wealth and other types of illiquid 
wealth in 2007.  
Figure 1.3 shows that about 30 percent of households whose leverage ratio is 
higher than 1 is IP-HtM, as regular mortgage payments absorb a significant fraction of 
disposable income and leave households little or no liquid savings. 
Robustness  
 Figure 1.4 and Table 1.4 report sensitivity analyses. Figure 1.4(a) plots the shares 
of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households weighted by income. The weighted 
fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households is smaller than its unweighted 
counterpart. Figure 1.4(b) shows the HtM shares when considering the pay period as 1 
month instead of 2 weeks: the fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM household 
increases by 17, 18, and 34 percent, respectively (the fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and 
W-HtM increase by 0.1, 1.9, and 5.2 percentage points, respectively). Likewise, the fifth 
line of Table 1.4 reports that when setting the pay period to 1 week, the share of IP-HtM 
and NIP-HtM household drops correspondingly by 17 percent and 13 percent. 
 Figure 1.4(c) shows that the fraction of IP-HtM households drops by 33 percent, 
with only a 3 percent decrease in NIP-HtM households if using the self-reported credit 
limit instead of 1 month of income as a credit limit.  Lastly, Figure 1.4(d) explores that if 
vehicles are included as illiquid wealth, about half of the IP-HtM and NIP-HtM move 
into the W-HtM group. 
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1.5 Demographics and Portfolio Composition of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth 
Households 
Figure 1.5 depicts the share of the different HtM households: IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, 
and W-HtM by age. The majority of observations of NIP-HtM household behavior occur 
in the early stages of the life cycle, at which time most people do not have any type of 
illiquid assets. The fraction of NIP-HtM households drops abruptly until age 30, as they 
acquire illiquid assets, and keeps dropping steadily over the life cycle until reaching 
around 6 percent at age 79. Figure 1.5 shows that the age profile of the fraction of W-
HtM households is prominently hump-shaped: it peaks at around age 38, and remains 
above 12 percentage points over the life cycle. Focusing on the IP-HtM households, there 
is no apparent age trend as the share of IP-HtM is consistently around 0.6 percent of the 
population for all age groups. 
 Figure 1.6 focuses on different demographic characteristics by age for the HtM 
households. Figure 1.6(a) indicates that IP-HtM and W-HtM groups have, on average, 
two more years of education than NIP-HtM households. In Figure 1.6(b), I cannot 
differentiate between IP-HtM and W-HtM households in terms of marital status. 
However, the NIP-HtM households are 35 percent less likely to be married. In terms of 
having children, Figure 1.6(c) shows that IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households are 
indistinguishable.  Figure 1.6(e) indicates that W-HtM households are less likely to have 
a member of their household unemployed than both categories of P-HtM.  
 Figure 1.6(d) reveals that, on average, IP-HtM households have a higher median 
income during the working years than NIP-HtM households. The interesting outcome is 
that the IP-HtM group is very similar to the W-HtM in terms of their income path, the 
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median income for NIP-HtM is about $15,000, while for W-HtM and IP-HtM it is about 
$20,000 higher, following a hump-age profile with the peak at about $40,000. IP-HtM 
and W-HtM have very similar patterns regarding their access of governments benefits, 
both in terms of what proportion of their income is due to government benefits (Figure 
6(f)) and the fraction of households that receive governments benefits (Figure 6(g)). 
There are about 20 percentage points more NIP-HtM than W-HtM and IP-HtM 
households that receive some form of government benefits and it is striking to notice that 
in most respects IP-HtM are more similar with W-HtM than with NIP-HtM households. 
In fact, out of the seven demographic characteristics analyzed, for five of them IP-HtM 
are similar to W-HtM and dissimilar from NIP-HtM, and for one a pattern cannot be 
observed. Only for one aspect are IP-HtM similar to NIP-HtM and different from W-
HtM.   
Figure 1.7 reports the age profile of the portfolio composition of IP-HtM, NIP-
HtM, and W-HtM households. Figure 1.7(a) explores the finding that median net liquid 
wealth holdings are zero at virtually every age for both the NIP-HtM and W-HtM 
households. Median net liquid wealth for IP-HtM households is, on an average, negative. 
Figure 1.7(b) shows that IP-HtM households are indebted in illiquid wealth whereas the 
W-HtM households have substantial amounts of illiquid wealth. Figures 1.7(c) and 1.7(d) 
plot the mean net liquid and illiquid wealth composition of the three HtM groups. Figure 
1.7(c) reveals that the IP-HtM and W-HtM households have negative mean net liquid 
wealth whereas it is zero for the NIP-HtM group across the life cycle. Figure 1.7(d) 
explores the similar pattern of age profile as observed in Figure 1.7(b) for all HtM 
groups. Figure 1.7(e) shows that the IP-HtM households have a higher mean fraction of 
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illiquid wealth in housing in all stages of the life cycle. Figure 1.7(f) shows that the IP-
HtM group holds a negative mean fraction of illiquid wealth in retirement accounts 
whereas the fraction falls steadily for the W-HtM through their life cycle. Figures 1.7(e) 
and 1.7(f) show that, in fact, all the illiquid wealth of the IP-HtM households is in 
housing, and retirement is a very negligible part of their portfolio.  
 Figure 1.8 articulates the income and balance-sheet composition of IP-HtM, NIP-
HtM, and W-HtM households over the years. Figures 1.8(a) and 1.8(b) explore that the 
IP-HtM and W-HtM groups have higher median and mean income than the NIP-HtM 
households all over the waves. One can also see that the mean and median income of IP-
HtM fluctuate more than the W-HtM households. Figures 1.8(c) and 1.8(d) show the 
median and mean net liquid wealth of different HtM households. The median net liquid 
wealth for IP-HtM is negative while, on average, it is zero for the other HtM groups. 
Though the mean liquid wealth is zero for the NIP-HtM, it is negative for other HtM 
households. Figures 1.8(e) and 1.8(f) reveal that the median and mean illiquid wealth are 
negative for the IP-HtM, zero for the NIP-HtM, and significantly positive for the W-HtM 
in all waves used. 
1.6 The Share of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households Based on Race and Regions  
I begin with the PSID core sample. Eliminated are households with missing 
values on education of head, race of head, or region where head grew up. Also dropped 
are households whose income grow more than 500 percent, fall by more than 80 percent, 
or are below $100 and top-coded income. I also drop the households where the head is 
less than 30 or more than 57 years old. The final sample has 50,475 observations over the 
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pooled 9 sample years. Table 1.5 displays the definitions of income, liquid assets, liquid 
debts, and net illiquid wealth. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus liquid debts. The 
definitions of income and wealth and the IP-HtM status indicators are the same as 
mentioned in Section 3. The pay period is set at every two weeks and the credit limit at 1 
month of income. 
Table 1.6 shows that 1.40 percent of households are IP-HtM in my PSID pooled 
1999-2015 waves in the United States. Table 1.6 also reports that 19.6 percent of 
households are NIP-HtM and about 24 percent of households are W-HtM. 
 Table 1.7 shows that the maximum share of the IP-HtM households are White, 
whereas Black households have the majority percentage in cases of P-HtM and NIP-HtM. 
The highest percentage of W-HtM households is White. Table 1.8 reveals that the highest 
percentage of all types of HtM households is from the southern part of the United States. 
1.7 Status Persistence of Indebted Hand-to-Mouth Households in PSID Data 
 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 analyze the persistence of the status of the households under 
consideration in PSID data. Table 1.9 depicts the forward transient state of different HtM 
and N-HtM households. Row 1 of Table 1.9 reports that about 1, 26, 28, and 45 percent 
of IP-HtM move to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the 
following wave. Row 2 shows that about 1, 25, 26, and 48 of NIP-HtM households move 
to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the next wave. Row 3 
displays the transient state of W-HtM and shows the similar pattern of transition to that of 
NIP-HtM. Row 4 shows that about 2, 25, 25, and 49 of N-HtM households shift to IP-
HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the following wave.  Given that 
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IP-HtM represent at the most 3 percent of all the households in the sample, it is not 
surprising that a small percentage of NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM end up being IP-
HtM in the next wave. It is interesting to note that the IP-HtM is very transient, as only 
1.1 percent of the affected households stay this way, and, in fact, about 45 percent of 
them end up being N-HtM. The probability of IP-HtM becoming N-HtM is, however, the 
smallest out of all the categories of households under consideration.  
Table 1.10 reveals the probability of backward transient state of different HtM 
and N-HtM households. Column 1 of Table 1.10 explores that 1, 21, 26, and 52 of IP-
HtMs were in the group of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM, respectively, in the 
previous wave. Column 2 shows that about 2, 24, 25, and 49 of NIP-HtM belonged to IP-
HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the last wave. Column 3 reports 
that about 2, 24, 27, and 47 of W-HtM belonged to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-
HtM, respectively in the previous wave. Column 4 displays that about 1.5, 23, 26, and 49 
of N-HtM belonged to IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, W-HtM, and N-HtM correspondingly in the 
last wave. 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the IP-HtM households previously ignored in the literature 
using the share of IP-HtMs in the United States. I find that about 1 percent of total 
households (more than 3 million people) and 6 percent of the P-HtM in the United States 
are IP-HtM in the pooled SCF 1989-2016 data. However, this increased to around 3 
percent during the Great Recession in 2008-2009 and fell during the recovery. I find 
almost the same share of IP-HtM households in the PSID survey data.  
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In previous studies, IP-HtM households were a share of P-HtM households. 
Nevertheless, I show that one cannot integrate IP-HtM households into the P-HtM group 
since demographic characteristics are far more similar to W-HtM than NIP-HtM. In fact, 
for more than three quarters of the characteristics analyzed, IP-HtMs are virtually 
indistinguishable from the W-HtMs. However, one cannot assimilate IP-HtM with W-
HtM because their portfolio composition is different from W-HtM. Therefore, IP-HtM 
households must have their own separate status in the literature. 
Overall, this study reveals three main findings by analyzing United States data. 
First, I find that between 0.6 and 3 percent of United States households are IP-HtM. 
Second, in terms of demographic characteristics, IP-HtM households are more similar to 
the W-HtM rather than to the P-HtM, the category in which they were previously 
assimilated. Third, the highest percentage of all HtM households is concentrated in the 
southern part of the United States and the maximum share of IP-HtMs is among White 
households.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. 1 Summary Information on the Survey Data Used 
Survey years SCF 1989-2016 
Initial sample size 47,776 
 
Exclusions 
 
Not age 22–79 2,858 
Negative income 10 
All income from self-employment 5,513 
 
Final sample size 
 
39,395 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United 
States. See text for full description of the data. 
 
 
Table 1. 2  Definitions of Income, Liquid assets, Liquid Debts, and Net Illiquid wealth 
(SCF) 
Items Components 
Income Gross wages and salaries, self-employment income, regular 
private transfers such as child support and alimony, public 
transfers such as unemployment benefits, food stamps, and 
Social Security Income (SSI), and regular income from other 
sources excluding investment income. 
  
Liquid assets Checking and savings accounts, money markets and call 
accounts, directly held mutual funds, stocks, corporate bonds 
and government bonds. 
 
Liquid debts Summation of all credit card balances that accrue interest after 
the most recent payment. 
 
Net illiquid wealth Value of housing, residential and non-residential real estate, net 
of mortgages and home equity loans, private retirement 
accounts (such as 401(k)s, IRAs, thrift accounts, and future 
pensions), cash value of life insurance policies, certificates of 
deposit, and savings bonds. 
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Table 1. 3 Household Income, Liquid and Illiquid Wealth Holdings, and Portfolio 
Composition 
  Median Mean Fraction Positive 
Income (age 22-59) 30,984 49,279 0.988 
Net worth 77,136 334,083 0.904 
Net liquid wealth 2,787 96,595 0.783 
Cash, checking, saving, MM accounts 3,333 27,024 0.909 
Directly held stocks 0 32,925 0.167 
Directly held bonds 0 8,607 0.023 
Revolving credit card debt 0 1,670 0.429 
Net illiquid wealth 67,370 23,7488 0.787 
Housing net of mortgages 40,714 149,176 0.66 
Retirement accounts 153 73,233 0.503 
Life insurance 0 8,193 0.256 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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Table 1. 4 Robustness Results for Fraction HtM in Each HtM Category 
 
  P-HtMi IP-HtMi NIP-HtMi W-HtMi 
Baseline 0.109 0.006 0.103 0.153 
Financially fragile 
householdsa 
0.175 0.009 0.167 0.305 
Reported credit limit 0.104 0.004 0.100 0.115 
1-year income credit limit 0.094 0.003 0.091 0.094 
Weekly pay period 0.094 0.005 0.090 0.122 
Monthly pay period 0.129 0.007 0.122 0.205 
Higher illiquid wealth cutoffb 0.117 0.117 0.000 0.145 
 Retirement account as liquid                         
for 60+c 
0.109 0.006 0.103 0.145 
Businesses as illiquid assetsd 0.103 0.005 0.097 0.154 
Direct as illiquid assetse 0.108 0.006 0.103 0.169 
Other valuables as illiquid     
assets 
0.105 0.006 0.099 0.157 
Excludes cc puzzle 
households 
0.151 0.006 0.145 0.143 
Home Equity Line of Credits 
(HELOCs) as liquid debt 
0.108 0.005 0.102 0.154 
Usual income 0.110 0.007 0.104 0.163 
Disposable income - 
Reportedf 
0.108 0.006 0.103 0.151 
Disposable income - Singlef 0.107 0.006 0.102 0.150 
Committed consumption-
beginning of periodg 
0.090 0.005 0.086 0.133 
Committed consumption-end 
of periodh 
0.139 0.00 0.131 0.214 
Source: Author’s calculations based on United States SCF pooled 1989–2016. See text for full description. 
a. Includes those households within $2,000 in liquid assets of their income threshold as HtM. 
b. Requires households to have above $1,000 in illiquid assets to be considered W-HtM. 
c. Puts retirement accounts into liquid wealth for households above age 60. 
d. Drops the self-employment income sample selection and adds business assets to illiquid wealth and 
self-employment income to income. 
e. Classifies directly held mutual funds, stocks, and corporate and government bonds as illiquid assets. 
f. Subtracts federal income taxes estimated from NBER’s TAXSIM from income. Disposable income 
(reported) assumes that each household files its actual marital status and number of children as dependents; 
disposable income (single) assumes that every household files as single with no dependents. 
g. Assumes the household’s committed consumption is incurred at the beginning of the period. 
h. Assumes the household’s committed consumption is incurred at the end of the period. 
i. P-HtM = poor - HtM; IP-HtM = indebted poor - HtM; NIP-HtM = not indebted poor - HtM;  
W-HtM = wealthy - HtM 
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Table 1. 5 Definitions of Consumption, Income, Liquid Assets, Liquid Debts and Net 
Illiquid Wealth (PSID) 
Items Components 
Income Government transfers plus labor earnings of a household. 
  
Liquid assets Money market funds, value of checking and savings accounts, 
certificates of deposit, savings bonds, and treasury bills, together 
with directly held shares of stock in publicly held corporations, 
investment trusts or mutual funds.  
  
Liquid debts Value of debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills, credit 
cards, and personal loans. 
  
Net illiquid wealth Summation of the value of private annuities or IRAs, value of 
home equity, net value of other real estate, value of other 
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, and life insurance 
policies. 
 
 
Table 1. 6 Fraction of HtM Households, PSID pooled 1999-2015 Waves, United States 
Year P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
1999 0.174 0.007 0.167 0.234 
2001 0.170 0.007 0.163 0.260 
2003 0.178 0.008 0.169 0.271 
2005 0.183 0.008 0.175 0.281 
2007 0.182 0.006 0.176 0.269 
2009 0.252 0.029 0.224 0.251 
2011 0.244 0.031 0.213 0.203 
2013 0.265 0.025 0.240 0.180 
2015 0.246 0.010 0.236 0.206 
Mean 0.210 0.014 0.196 0.239 
 
 
Table 1. 7 Percentage of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM Households Based on Races 
 P-HtM (%) IP-HtM (%) NIP-HtM (%) W-HtM (%) 
 
White 
 
33.52 
 
 
53.41 
 
32.29 
 
55.74 
Black 59.41 
 
37.03 60.79 36.89 
Others 7.08 
 
9.56 6.92 7.37 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled 
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
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Table 1. 8 Percentage of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM Households Based on Regions 
 P-HtM (%) IP-HtM (%) NIP-HtM (%) W-HtM (%) 
 
Northeast 
 
10.52 
 
 
8.06 
 
10.72 
 
12.82 
Midwest 21.87 
 
22.78 21.79 24.08 
South 48.94 
 
43.95 49.35 47.67 
West 18.66 
 
25.20 18.14 15.44 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled 
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
 
 
Table 1. 9 Probability of Forward Transient state of HtM Households 
                     
          → 
IP-HtM 
 
NIP-HtM W-HtM N-HtM 
IP-HtM 0.011 
 
0.261 0.278 0.449 
NIP-HtM 0.013 
 
0.246 0.261 0.479 
W-HtM 0.014 
 
0.241 0.262 0.482 
N-HtM 0.016 
 
0.247 0.246 0.490 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled 
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
 
 
Table 1. 10 Probability of Backward Transient state of HtM Households 
                     
          → 
IP-HtM 
 
NIP-HtM W-HtM N-HtM 
IP-HtM 0.012 
 
0.017 0.018 0.015 
NIP-HtM 0.207 
 
0.237 0.243 0.234 
W-HtM 0.256 
 
0.254 0.267 0.258 
N-HtM 0.524 
 
0.491 0.472 0.493 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled 
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
 
 
27 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. 1 Distribution of Liquid Wealth to Monthly Income Ratios 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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  Figure 1. 2 Fraction of Hand-to-Mouth (HtM) Households, United States 
  
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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Figure 1. 3 Share of HtM Households among Homeowners by Leverage Ratio 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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Figure 1. 4 Fraction of HtM Households, United States, Alternate Definitions 
 
  
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),  
United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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Figure 1. 5 Age Profile of Fraction of IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W- HtM Households 
 
Note: Age refers to that of the head of the household. Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016, 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
 
 
Figure 1. 6 Age Profile of the IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W- HtM, United States, by 
Demographic Characteristics 
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Note: Age refers to that of the head of the household. Average years of education refer to that of the head of 
the household. Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
United States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
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Figure 1. 7 Age Profile of the Portfolio Composition of the IP-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W- 
HtM Households 
  
  
 
 
Note:  Age refers to that of the head of household.  To reduce the sensitivity to outliers, I compute means 
after trimming the overall top and bottom 0.1 percent of the statistic’s distribution. Author’s calculations 
based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United States, age limit 22-79. See text 
for full description of the data. 
 
 
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
NIP-HtM
Figure 1.7(a) Median net liquid wealth
-200000
-100000
0
100000
200000
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
NIP-HtM
Figure 1.7(b) Median net illiquid wealth
-60000
-40000
-20000
0
20000
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
NIP-HtM
Figure 1.7(c) Mean net liquid wealth
-100000
0
100000
200000
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
NIP-HtM
Figure 1.7(d) Mean net illiquid wealth
0
.5
1
1.5
2
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
Figure 1.7(e) Mean fraction of illiquid wealth in housing
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
20 40 60 80
Age
W-HtM IP-HtM
Figure 1.7(f) Mean fraction of illiquid wealth in retirement account
34 
 
Figure 1. 8 Income and Portfolio Composition5 of different HtM Households over the 
Years  
  
  
  
Note: Author’s calculations based on the pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
 
                                                 
5 Visit Table A 1.1 and A1.2 in Appendices for more information. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. 1 Portfolio Characteristics by HtM Status.  
Different HtM Households WHtM NHtM IPHtM NIPHtM 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: mean -1.243 18.069 -2.108 -0.444 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: p10 -3.691 -0.035 -5.291 -0.633 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: p25 -1.611 0.601 -2.718 0 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: p50 0.001 1.995 -1.23 0 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: p75 0.103 7.873 0.069 0.062 
Liquid wealth / monthly income: p90 0.187 30.675 0.168 0.147 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: mean 0.595 0.593 1.267 . 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p10 0 0 1 . 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p25 0.161 0.29 1 . 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p50 0.821 0.657 1 . 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p75 1 0.96 1.261 . 
Housing fraction of illquid wealth: p90 1 1 1.68 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: mean 0.331 0.328 -0.29 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p10 0 0 -0.664 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p25 0 0 -0.246 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p50 0.044 0.23 0 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p75 0.629 0.588 0 . 
Retirement fraction of illquid wealth: p90 1 0.993 0 . 
Fraction with negative liquid wealth 0.384 0.104 0.574 0.113 
Fraction with positive equity in housing 0.786 0.708 0 0 
Fraction with positive retirement 0.542 0.613 0.407 0 
Fraction with negative illiquid wealth 0 0.027 1 0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Pooled 1989–2016, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) United 
States, age limit 22-79. See text for full description of the data. 
 
Note: To reduce the sensitivity outliers, means are computed after trimming the overall top and bottom 0.1 
percent of that statistic’s distribution. 
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Table A1. 2 Portfolio Composition of N-HtM Households 
 Net Illiquid wealth Net Liquid wealth 
Waves Total Median Mean Total Median Mean 
1999-2015 3444000000 77000 194224 1543000000 13000 87016 
1999 286100000 63000 146590 139300000 12000 71337 
2001 345300000 73000 171198 177800000 12000 88130 
2003 363800000 85500 177827 181300000 14600 89490 
2005 499100000 110000 256628 196500000 15000 101043 
2007 505100000 120000 256398 205800000 14000 104481 
2009 402200000 88250 222975 190800000 15000 105746 
2011 376900000 64500 186976 157000000 12000 77859 
2013 318100000 56000 157477 154500000 11000 76479 
2015 347000000 52000 176930 138200000 11800 70472 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) pooled 
1999-2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONSUMPTION RESPONSE OF THE INDEBTED HAND-TO-MOUTH 
HOUSEHOLDS TO TRANSITORY INCOME SHOCKS 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates how total consumption and different subcategories of 
consumption such as food, nonfood, durable and nondurable goods of indebted hand-to-
mouth (IP-HtM) households react to a transitory income change. In addition, I describe 
the responses to the unexpected income shocks for the social sector, healthcare, and 
utilities, which are different components of nonfood items. I compare these results with 
other hand-to-mouth households (discussed in Chapter 1), poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM), 
not indebted poor hand-to-mouth (NIP-HtM) and wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM). 
I collected pooled data from the Household and Individual Dataset for the period 
of 1999-2015 at the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I estimate the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income shocks of the IP-HtMs for total 
consumption and examine the MPCs of food, nonfood, durable and nondurable 
consumption expenditure of IP-HtM households. In addition, I describe the MPCs for the 
social sector, healthcare, and utilities, which are different items of the nonfood item 
category.  
A longitudinal data set that includes information on income, consumption, and 
liquid and illiquid wealth at the household level is necessary to estimate the MPCs. I use 
the 9 waves of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID survey on the United States 
household portfolios.  
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Using the methodology proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), 
Kaplan and Violante (2010), and Kaplan et al. (2014), I estimate the consumption 
response to transitory changes in income. Unlike these studies, I use the updated sample 
periods with enriched data, estimate the transmission coefficients of income shocks to 
consumption for IP-HtM households, and find the MPCs separately for other types of 
HtM households. These two empirical analyses differentiate this study from Blundell et 
al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014). 
In data, results show that in the baseline specification, MPC of the total 
consumption for the IP-HtM households is 0.97. However, it is 0.42, 0.23, 0.48, 0.71, and 
0.62 for nondurable, durable, nonfood, food, and utilities, respectively. In comparing 
these results to the responses of P-HtM, NIP-HtM and W-HtM households, I find that the 
consumption of IP-HtM households is the most responsive (highest MPC) for all 
consumption items except durables, healthcare, and social sector expenditure in the 
baseline specification. This suggests that the government can obtain the maximum 
effectiveness of its stimulatory policies for the IP-HtM households. This study can help 
government design and execute the fiscal policies directing the highest stimulatory effect 
during economic slowdown. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the 
literature review, section three discusses the data and methodology, section four explores 
the results and robustness, and the final section concludes.  
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
Several studies estimate MPC for different groups of households based on their 
economic stratum. Using panel data on the United States households, Dynan, Skinner, 
and Zeldes (2004), and McCarthy (1995) found that the MPC is higher for lower income 
households. Likewise, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) using data on Italian households 
found that the MPC of households with lower cash-on-hand is higher than that of the 
more affluent households. Using a panel dataset of U.S. households, Filer and Fisher 
(2007) identified households that are more likely to be credit constrained as those who 
have filed for bankruptcy in the past 10 years. They found that these households tend to 
earn lower incomes (before and after bankruptcy filing) and show higher MPCs. Using 
data from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES), Murugasu, Wei, and Hwa (2013) 
estimated the MPC out of disposable income for Malaysian households and examined 
how the propensities differ across income brackets. Their findings show that the MPC 
from income for poor households is higher when compared with higher income 
households. The MPCs differ from 0.81 for those earning below Malaysian ringgit 
1,000(RM1,000) to 0.25 for those earning above RM10,000.  
Hayashi (1985) determined that the reasons poorer households have higher MPCs 
are that they have credit-constraints, an inability to save and possibly lower levels of 
financial knowledge. He also noted that credit constraints, or credit rationing, arise when 
households cannot borrow the amount they desire. Lower income households have less 
access to credit markets due to their current and expected future lower incomes in 
addition to lower ownership of usable assets for collateral for loans. When subject to 
temporary negative income shocks, these households would like to but are unable to 
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borrow against their expected future incomes and consume less than optimal at that point, 
making it most likely that an increase in income will be consumed rather than saved.  
Beverly and Sherraden (1999) considered the hypothesis that financial literacy 
similarly plays a role in the savings and consumption behavior of households. Their 
argument is that lower income individuals, who often have a lower level of education, 
also tend to be less financially literate. Meanwhile, Lawrance (1991) and Bucks and 
Pence (2008) showed that poorer households tend to have lower foresight when it comes 
to financial planning. Therefore, lower income households are inclined to be less aware 
of the available savings instruments and are less likely to surrender consumption to 
accumulate assets, making consumption more sensitive to income shocks. Moreover, the 
lower level of financial literacy makes lower income households less likely to buy 
insurance to help smooth consumption from unanticipated income shocks. Furthermore, 
Lusardi and Tufano (2015) emphasized that low-income households are less debt literate 
and often engage in higher cost borrowing transactions. 
By focusing on the different categories of HtM households, Kaplan et al. (2014) 
estimated that the MPC of the W-HtM households is the highest, around 0.30. The point 
estimate of the MPC for P-HtM is 0.24, and is less than 0.13 for N-HtM.  
Knowing the MPC informs policy makers about the effects of fiscal stimulus 
policies on aggregate consumption. MPC can, however be derived for finer categories of 
consumption for a more precise targeting of these policies.  Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 
(2006) considered spending on strictly nondurable goods such as food and alcoholic 
beverages (at and away from home), utilities (and fuels and public services), household 
operations, public transportation, gas and motor oil, personal care, tobacco, and 
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miscellaneous goods. They broadly defined nondurable goods adding expenditures on 
apparel goods and services, healthcare expenditures (excluding payments by employers 
or insurers), and reading materials, following Lusardi (1996), but did not include 
education. They studied the response of consumption to the 2001 fiscal stimulus 
implemented in the United States and show that 37 percent of the rebate goes toward 
increased consumption of nondurable goods and about 11 percent toward increased 
consumption of food. Kaplan and Violante (2014a) prepared a similar correction and 
found close results. Misra and Surico (2014) refined the technique to account for 
heterogeneity in the response of consumption and estimated a marginal propensity to 
spend on nondurable goods of 0.25. 
In his pioneering study, Bodkin (1959) designed an experiment looking at the 
consumption behavior of World War II veterans after their receipt of unanticipated 
dividend payments from the National Service Life Insurance. Bodkin considered the 
dividend payments to be unexpected and that they represented a windfall source of 
income and derived a point estimate of the MPC nondurables of 0.72. Souleles (1999) 
exploited tax refunds between 1979 and 1990 and found the MPC for nondurable goods 
out of a transitory income gain ranged between 0.5 and 0.9 within the quarter following 
receipt and statistically significant.         
Browning and Crossley (2003) estimated that the MPC for nondurable goods was 
either zero or very small. However, the MPC for durable goods is very large for impatient 
agents. Paradoxically, it can be large also for the patient agents if the agents are 
unconstrained. They noted that patient agents without any constraint naturally carry 
forward debt so that they are less able to maintain purchases of durables in distress.  
42 
 
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013) showed the importance of 
distinguishing between nondurable and total spending and found that households spent 
between 0.12 and 0.30 of their 2008 United States stimulus payments on nondurable 
goods; when durable goods are included this rises to between 0.50 and 0.90. These 
studies adequately estimate the impact of a fiscal stimulus during an economic downturn; 
nonetheless, because the MPC out of unexpected income gains is usually higher when 
households are in a low earnings state, they may be overestimating the response of 
consumption to a typical transitory income shock.  
Browning and Crossley (2009) found in their study among Canadian unemployed 
workers that those with lower unemployment benefits reduced expenditure on durable 
goods more. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2012) showed households experiencing a 
minimum wage increase augmented expenditure on durables more than on nondurables 
and the collateralized debts of these households concomitantly rose. 
Krueger and Perri (2011), using the Italian Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (1987-2008) and the two waves of the PSID (2004-2006) data, estimated that for 
households that have neither wealth nor real estate nondurable consumption changes by 
about 23 percent in response to a short run (two years) change in post-tax labor income; 
whereas, financial wealth responds by about17 percent. They also found that changes in 
spending on durable goods move in the same direction with income shocks but less so 
than changes in spending on nondurables.            
Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, Pistaferri, and Rooij (2017) derived the average 
MPC corresponding to nondurable consumption to be in the range of 0.15 to 0.25. They 
also showed that it rises with age and is larger at low levels of economic resources.    
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
I use longitudinal PSID data to examine the consumption behavior of IP-HtM 
households. Based on the definitions of different HtMs described in chapter 1, and using 
the methodology proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010), and 
Kaplan et al. (2014), I derive the MPC out of transitory income shocks for various HtM 
households. For most specifications, I derive that the IP-HtM households have the highest 
MPC out of unexpected change in income. 
 I use the updated sample period with enriched data to estimate the transmission 
coefficients of income shocks to total consumption and various items of consumption for 
IP-HtM households. I also find the MPCs separately for other types of HtM households. 
These two empirical analyses make this study unique from Blundell et al. (2008) and 
Kaplan et al. (2014).  
2.3.1 Data Source, Sample Selection and Definitions 
 
It is necessary to have a longitudinal data set with information on income, 
consumption, and liquid and illiquid wealth at the household level to estimate the 
consumption response to income shocks for IP-HtM households with different groups of 
HtM households. I use 9 waves of pooled data (1999–2015) from the PSID.  
 I start with the PSID core sample and drop the households with missing values on 
race of head, or region where head grew up, education of head. Also eliminated are 
households whose income fall by more than 80 percent, or are below $100, grow more 
than 500 percent, and top-coded income or consumption. Since the identification of the 
coefficients of interest requires a minimum of three periods, I only keep the households 
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that appear in the sample in at least three consecutive waves. I keep the households where 
the head is 30-57 years old. The final sample has 50,475 observations over the pooled 9 
sample years.  
I follow Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016), and Kaplan et al. (2014) 
to construct the consumption measure. Table 2.1 displays the definitions of consumption; 
various items of consumption such as nondurable, durable, food and noon food; income; 
liquid assets; liquid debts; and net illiquid wealth. Net liquid asset is liquid assets minus 
liquid debts.  
2.3.2 Methodology 
 
 I use the methodology of Kaplan et al. (2014) to estimate the consumption 
response to transitory changes in income. A more detailed description of this 
methodology is available in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010) I 
mention only the important steps here: 
(i) Regressing log income and log consumption expenditures on year and cohort 
dummies, education, race, family structure, employment, geographic 
variables, and interactions of year dummies with education, race, 
employment, and region.  
(ii) Constructing the first-differenced residuals of log consumption ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡 and log 
income ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡.  
(iii) A period is 2 years as the survey is biannual. The income process  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an 
error component model that consists of orthogonal permanent and i.i.d. 
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(independently and identically distributed) components. Therefore, income 
growth is represented by 
                   ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  ∆𝜃𝑖𝑡   
                  where 𝜃𝑖𝑡 is the transitory shock and 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the permanent shock.  
(iv) The MPC, the Blundell et al. (2008) estimator of the transmission coefficient 
of transitory income shocks to consumption is 
𝑀𝑃?̃?𝑡 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 )
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑦𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 )
 
(v) The exact MPC out of a transitory shock is expressed as 
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑡 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑣 ( ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖𝑡  )
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝑖𝑡  )
 
(vi) The estimator in (iv) is a consistent estimator of (v) if the household has no 
foresight of future shocks, explicitly: 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 ( ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 ) = 0,  
(vii) The estimator is realized by an instrumental (IV) regression of ∆𝑐𝑖𝑡 on ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡, 
instrumented by ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1 . It is mentioned that  ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +1  is correlated with the 
transitory shock ( 𝜃𝑖𝑡) at t, but not with the permanent one ( 𝛼𝑖𝑡).  
 Kaplan and Violante (2010) indicate the presence of tight borrowing constraints does 
not bias the estimate of the transmission coefficient for transitory shocks.  
2.4  Results and Robustness 
 
 Table 2.2 provides the results for total consumption. The MPC of the IP-HtM 
households is the highest, around 0.97 in the baseline specification. The point estimate of 
the MPC for the P-HtM is 0.39, for the NIP-HtM 0.34, and for the W-HtM 0.37. This 
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result is not surprising if one thinks of the IP-HtM as W-HtM facing temporary severe 
financial constraints. There are two intuitions behind the responsiveness behavior of IP-
HtM. First, the IP-HtM households spend the maximum share of their income on 
mortgage payments leaving a small portion for consumption. This results in high 
responsiveness in their consumption behavior due to any positive income shock. Second, 
IP-HtM households face credit constraints that induce them to spend most of their share 
of increased transitory income for consumption. 
 The rest of the rows in Table 2.2 show robustness tests with respect to the 
definition of household composition, income and consumption, and the assumed pay 
period (monthly income). The MPCs of the IP-HtM group are always the highest among 
all other HtM households as in the baseline specification. Under the definition of 
“monthly pay period,” the MPC decreases for IP-HtM and W-HtM households, whereas 
it increases for P-HtM and NIP-HtM households. If the definition is either “male 
household head” or “pretax earnings” or “include food stamps,” the MPCs fall for all 
types of HtM households. On the contrary, if the marital status of the head is stable, it 
increases for all groups of HtM except W-HtM. Table 2.2 also reports that MPCs 
decrease for P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM if the sample is restricted to the households 
of the continuously married.  
The important outcome that the consumption of the IP-HtM shows the highest 
sensitivity to temporary income shocks out of all HtM households is similar to the 
findings of some recent studies. Baker (2013) incorporated several original sources of 
household data on income, consumption expenditures, and household financial 
statements to examine the co-movement of consumption and income at the micro level 
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during the Great Recession. He shows that expenditures of highly indebted households 
with illiquid assets are especially sensitive to income fluctuations. Cloyne and Surico 
(2014) executed a long span of expenditure survey data for the United Kingdom and a 
narrative measure of exogenous income tax changes. They also showed that the 
homeowners with high leverage ratios present large and persistent consumption responses 
to tax shocks. Misra and Surico (2014) built on the study of Johnson et al. (2006) and 
Parker et al. (2013) on the 2001 and 2008 fiscal stimulus payment programs in the United 
States. They found that for both stimulus episodes the largest propensity to consume out 
of the tax rebate is among households that own real estate but have high levels of 
mortgage debt.  
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the MPC of nondurable consumption is higher than that 
of the durable for all groups of HtM households except W-HtM in the baseline 
specification. This finding is supported by Krueger and Perri (2011). For nondurable 
consumption, the MPC of the IP-HtM households is the highest, around 0.42, among 
other HtMs. On the other hand, W-HtM households are the most responsive for durable 
consumption with the MPC of about 0.49.   
 Table 2.3 reveals that for the first three robustness tests the MPC of nondurable 
drops for all groups of HtMs. In contrast to that, MPC increases for all if the pay period is 
monthly instead of biweekly. Table 2.3 also shows that for households with stable marital 
status, MPC of IP-HtM and W-HtM show the same pattern of change. However, MPC 
changes in the opposite direction for these two groups if the household head is male. 
Table 2.4 displays that only the MPCs of W-HtM households are statistically significant 
for durable consumption.  
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Table 2.5 summarizes the results for nonfood consumption. The point estimate of 
the MPC for the IP-HtM is the highest, around 0.48 and for the W-HtM is the lowest, 
0.27 in the baseline specification.  The remaining rows in Table 2.5 offer a robustness 
analysis and show that IP-HtM households are the most responsive out of all HtMs for all 
alternative definitions.  
 Table 2.5 reports that for the first two robustness tests the MPC of nonfood 
decreases for all groups of HtMs. On the other hand, MPC rises for all HtMs if the pay 
period under consideration is monthly. I also observe in Table 2.5 that for households 
with a stable marital status, MPC of IP-HtM and W-HtM changes in the same direction. 
However, I see the opposite pattern of change of MPCs for these two groups if the 
household head is male and the households are continuously married.   
 Table 2.6 explores the finding that the IP-HtM households are more responsive in 
the food expenditure to sudden changes in income than other groups of HtMs in the 
baseline specification.  
 The remaining rows in Table 2.6 offer a robustness analysis with respect to the 
definition of income and consumption, household composition, and the assumed pay 
period. I find statistically significant results only for IP-HtM and W-HtM households. 
The ranking of MPC among the two HtMs is always as in the baseline specification. 
Table 2.6 also shows that the MPC of IP-HtM declines for all alternative definitions. Like 
IP-HtM, I see the same pattern of change of MPC for W-HtM with the only exception 
being if I consider a monthly pay period.  
 Table 2.7 displays that IP-HtM households are the most responsive, around 0.62, 
and NIP-HtM households are the least responsive, around 0.21, in utility expenditure to 
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the transitory income shocks in the baseline. In robustness tests, only in the definitions of 
“pre-tax earnings” and “include food stamps” does MPC change in the same direction for 
IP-HtM and W-HtM. However, I see the opposite pattern of change of MPC of these two 
groups for all other definitions in robustness tests. 
 Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that the MPCs of healthcare and social sector (education 
and healthcare together) consumption are statistically significant for all HtM households 
except IP-HtM. P-HtM, NIP-HtM, and W-HtM households that experience income rises 
tend to seek better education and healthcare (social sector consumption) and to send their 
children to better educational institutions.  For the first three alternative definitions and 
“households with male head,” the MPCs of healthcare expenditure drop for all HtM 
households except IP-HtM. Under the monthly pay period system, the MPCs of P-HtM 
and NIP-HtM increase, whereas it decreases for W-HtM.  
2.5   Conclusion 
 
The study is a detailed analysis of how the total consumption and the different 
subcategories of consumption such as food, nonfood, durable, nondurable, social sector, 
utilities, and healthcare of the IP-HtM households react to the transitory income changes. 
This study also compares these results to other HtM households. 
Findings show that the MPC of the total consumption for IP-HtM is the highest 
among all the categories of households in the baseline specification. The study also 
shows that among all HtMs, the consumption of IP-HtM households is the most 
responsive for all consumption items except durables, healthcare, and social sector 
expenditure in the baseline specification. These results are also supported by some recent 
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studies. Cloyne and Surico (2014) performed a long span of expenditure survey data for 
the United Kingdom and a narrative measure of exogenous income tax variations. They 
also found that the homeowners with high leverage ratios show large and persistent 
consumption responses to tax changes. Misra and Surico (2014) built on the study of 
Johnson et al. (2006) and Parker et al. (2013) on the 2001 and 2008 fiscal stimulus 
payment programs in the United States. They showed that for both stimulus episodes the 
largest responses to consumption out of the tax rebate is among households that own real 
estate but have high levels of mortgage debt. Baker (2013) combined several original 
sources of household data on consumption expenditures, income, and household financial 
statements to examine the co-movement of consumption and income at the micro level 
during the Great Recession. He finds that expenditures of highly indebted households 
with illiquid assets are especially sensitive to income variations. Results suggest that the 
stimulatory government’s policies have maximum effectiveness for the IP-HtM 
households.  This study can encourage governments to design and implement their fiscal 
policies by aiming for the highest stimulatory effect during an economic downturn. 
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TABLES 
Table 2. 1 Definitions of Consumption, Income, Liquid Assets, Liquid Debts and Net 
Illiquid Wealth (PSID) 
Items Components 
Consumption Utilities, public transportation, food, childcare, healthcare, 
gasoline, car maintenance, and education. 
  
Nondurable Food, utilities, public transportation, and healthcare. 
  
Durable Cars (vehicle loan payment and down payment), housing 
(mortgage payments), and home improvement (household 
furnishing and equipment). 
  
Nonfood Utilities, public transportation, childcare, healthcare, gasoline, 
car maintenance, and education. 
  
Food Food at home and away from home. 
  
Social sector Education and healthcare. 
  
Income Government transfers plus labor earnings of a household. 
  
Liquid assets Money market funds, value of checking and savings accounts, 
certificates of deposit, savings bonds, and treasury bills, 
together with directly held shares of stock in publicly held 
corporations, investment trusts or mutual funds.  
  
Liquid debts Value of debts such as student loans, medical or legal bills, 
credit cards, and personal loans. 
  
Net illiquid wealth Summation of the value of private annuities or IRAs, value of 
home equity, net value of other real estate, value of other 
investments in trusts or estates, bond funds, and life insurance 
policies. 
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Table 2. 2 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (total consumption) a 
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.391*** 
(0.089) 
0.974*** 
(0.366) 
0.344*** 
(0.092) 
0.371*** 
(0.080) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.210*** 
(0.056) 
0.861*** 
(0.283) 
0.166*** 
(0.057) 
0.215*** 
(0.060) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.380*** 
(0.087) 
0.941*** 
(0.363) 
0.335*** 
(0.090) 
0.350*** 
(0.080) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.280 
(0.251) 
1.401** 
(0.678) 
0.082 
(0.276) 
0.160 
(0.126) 
  
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.467*** 
(0.116) 
1.110*** 
(0.364) 
0.399*** 
(0.123) 
0.333*** 
(0.089) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.220* 
(0.113) 
0.632 
(0.429) 
0.186 
(0.117) 
 
0.252*** 
(0.095) 
Monthly incomeg 0.430*** 
(0.084) 
0.958*** 
(0.287) 
0.378*** 
(0.088) 
0.350*** 
(0.073)  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 3 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (nondurable)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.230*** 
(0.060) 
0.422** 
(0.194)  
0.217*** 
(0.064) 
0.254*** 
(0.046) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.104*** 
(0.036) 
0.410*** 
(0.152)  
0.089** 
(0.038) 
0.157*** 
(0.035) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.215*** 
(0.057) 
0.376* 
(0.192)  
0.204*** 
(0.060) 
0.226*** 
(0.046) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.214 
(0.156) 
0.415 
(0.320) 
0.177 
(0.178) 
0.185** 
(0.077) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.253*** 
(0.080) 
0.295 
(0.186)  
0.249*** 
(0.088) 
0.232*** 
(0.0530 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.185*** 
(0.072) 
0.540** 
(0.241)  
0.157** 
(0.077) 
0.174*** 
(0.055) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.272*** 
(0.056) 
0.482*** 
(0.157)  
0.256*** 
(0.060) 
0.277*** 
(0.042) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 4 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (durable)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.197 
(0.475) 
0.235 
(0.605)  
0.141 
(0.576) 
0.488*** 
(0.190) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.205 
(0.269) 
0.452 
(0.465)  
0.102 
(0.313) 
0.281** 
(0.131) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.240 
(0.362) 
0.082 
(0.601)  
0.229 
(0.416) 
0.410** 
(0.185) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.704 
(1.009) 
1.899 
(0.990)  
0.012 
(1.470) 
0.191 
(0.264) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.598 
(0.585) 
0.652 
(0.548)  
0.582 
(0.763) 
0.319 
(0.196) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
-0.003 
(0.552) 
0.298 
(0.728)  
-0.166 
(0.679) 
0.513** 
(0.224) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.202 
(0.439) 
0.437 
(0.469)  
0.064 
(0.553) 
0.516*** 
(0.174) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 5 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (nonfood)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.297*** 
(0.076)  
0.483** 
(0.224) 
0.285*** 
(0.081) 
0.275*** 
(0.054) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.126*** 
(0.047)  
0.450** 
(0.177) 
0.112** 
(0.050) 
0.144*** 
(0.040) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.261*** 
(0.074)  
0.426* 
(0.224) 
0.251*** 
(0.079) 
0.232*** 
(0.053) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.308** 
(0.182) 
0.555 
(0.371) 
0.261 
(0.206) 
0.172* 
(0.090) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.350*** 
(0.103)  
0.299 
(0.213) 
0.355*** 
(0.113) 
0.220*** 
(0.060) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.223** 
(0.090)  
0.684** 
(0.282) 
0.188* 
(0.097) 
0.183*** 
(0.064) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.338*** 
(0.070)  
0.586*** 
(0.184) 
0.319*** 
(0.076) 
0.294*** 
(0.049) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 6 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (food)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.063 
(0.094)  
0.710** 
(0.311) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.189*** 
(0.070) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.018 
(0.058)  
0.654*** 
(0.235) 
-0.020 
(0.061) 
0.170*** 
(0.051) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
-0.053 
(0.071)  
0.378 
(0.306) 
-0.084 
(0.074) 
0.130** 
(0.063) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
-0.281 
(0.238) 
0.283 
(0.463) 
-0.402 
(0.277) 
0.167 
(0.109) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.027 
(0.124)  
0.627** 
(0.303) 
-0.040 
(0.137) 
0.182** 
(0.081) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
-0.005 
(0.112)  
0.548 
(0.355) 
-0.053 
(0.121) 
0.117 
(0.081) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.110 
(0.085)  
0.700** 
(0.275) 
0.058 
(0.091) 
0.231*** 
(0.063) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 7 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (utilities)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.242** 
(0.098)  
0.622** 
(0.285) 
0.208** 
(0.106) 
0.212*** 
(0.060) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.121** 
(0.059)  
0.473** 
(0.216) 
0.099 
(0.063) 
0.109** 
(0.044) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.216** 
(0.094)  
0.472* 
(0.285) 
0.195* 
(0.100) 
0.136** 
(0.061) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
-0.093 
(0.210) 
0.387 
(0.477) 
-0.193 
(0.240) 
0.215** 
(0.097) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.262 
(0.126)  
0.632** 
(0.293) 
0.217 
(0.140) 
0.164** 
(0.068) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.161 
(0.122)  
0.639* 
(0.350) 
0.114 
(0.132) 
0.187*** 
(0.069) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.254*** 
(0.090)  
0.587** 
(0.225) 
0.219** 
(0.098) 
0.245*** 
(0.056) 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 8 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (healthcare)a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.749*** 
(0.246)  
0.003 
(0.843) 
0.812*** 
(0.261) 
0.587*** 
(0.176) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.509*** 
(0.168)  
0.248 
(0.759) 
0.522*** 
(0.176) 
0.528*** 
(0.147) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.479** 
(0.232)  
-0.330 
(0.869) 
0.540** 
(0.244) 
0.496*** 
(0.174) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.170 
(0.491) 
-0.665 
(1.675) 
0.281 
(0.516) 
0.085 
(0.277) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.507* 
(0.230)  
-0.359 
(0.809) 
0.597* 
(0.325) 
0.640*** 
(0.203) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.733** 
(0.291)  
-0.053 
(1.105) 
0.797*** 
(0.306) 
0.258 
(0.203) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.7634*** 
(0.233)  
0.064 
(0.688) 
0.833*** 
(0.250) 
0.566*** 
(0.158) 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
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Table 2. 9 Marginal Propensity to Consume out of Transitory Income Shocks for 
Different Types of HtM Households (social sector: healthcare and education) a   
 P-HtM IP-HtM NIP-HtM W-HtM 
Baseline 0.612*** 
(0.166)  
-0.133 
(0.516) 
0.669*** 
(0.177) 
0.469*** 
(0.114) 
  
Pre-tax earningsb 0.317*** 
(0.106)  
-0.007 
(0.394) 
0.332*** 
(0.112) 
0.269*** 
(0.084) 
  
Include food 
stampsc 
0.433*** 
(0.156)  
-0.103 
(0.473) 
0.472*** 
(0.167) 
0.302*** 
(0.111) 
  
Continuously 
married 
householdsd 
  
0.409 
(0.344) 
-0.313 
(0.844) 
0.557 
(0.380) 
0.407** 
(0.186) 
Stable marital 
statuse 
0.456** 
(0.216)  
-0.225 
(0.533) 
0.530** 
(0.236) 
0.432*** 
(0.130) 
  
Households with 
male headsf 
0.652*** 
(0.196)  
-0.085 
(0.560) 
0.717*** 
(0.211) 
0.293** 
(0.132) 
  
Monthly incomeg 0.714*** 
(0.155)  
0.079 
(0.415) 
0.771*** 
(0.1680 
0.489*** 
(0.102) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the United States Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1999-
2015 waves, age limit 30-57. See text for full description. 
a. Boot-strapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
b. Gross income before taxes are paid. Transfers are excluded. 
c. Food stamps are included among transfers. 
d. Restricted to continuously married households. 
e. Restricted to households with no change in marital status. 
f. Households with female heads (mostly single) are excluded. 
g. Pay period is set to one month instead of two weeks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
CHAPTER 3 
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE OF A RESOURCE-
CONSTRAINED COMMUNITY: EVIDENCE FROM RICKSHAW PULLERS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Ill health adversely affects the standard of living, especially of the working class 
of a society, by reducing real income. The pathways from ill health to poverty work 
through the direct costs of treatment and non-medical care and the indirect costs of lost 
income (due to days absent from work and reduced productivity) of the affected person. 
The working-class population-for instance, daily laborers-become more efficient and 
their working hours increase if they have good health. They go to work almost every day 
and do a painstaking job. The health status of this population is affected by poverty, lack 
of education and awareness, lack of available affordable and high-quality healthcare, and 
negligence among policymakers. Auvinen (1997) showed that a well-planned healthcare 
financing system protects a population against the financial risks of ill health. Aghion, 
Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) and Baer, Campino, and Cavalcanti (2001) presented 
that households’ out-of-pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure is a major component of 
health system finance in middle- and low-income countries. Bardhan (1997) showed that 
when households face substantial medical expenses, they are pushed into poverty or 
forced deeper into poverty. 
Low-income households like those of day laborers live from hand to mouth, and 
they spend a large proportion of their income on their basic survival necessities. They 
cannot afford their required healthcare services. They might decrease their healthcare 
expenditure if there is any increase in OOP medical costs, and even small copayments 
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might reduce the likelihood of receiving necessary healthcare. Healthcare providers can 
give better services to the working-class population if they know the determinants of 
healthcare expenditure among this group of people. The purpose of this study is to 
estimate the determinants of healthcare expenditure in a resource-constrained population. 
This study focuses on a survey conducted among rickshaw pullers (RPs) in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. RPs are representative of a resource-constrained community in a developing 
country, since they have underprivileged social and economic status due to the nature of 
the service they provide to their society, they have insufficient access to high-quality 
healthcare services, and they lack human and physical capital. A survey of rickshaw 
pullers conducted by Begum and Sen (2004) revealed that rickshaw driving on a regular 
basis is extremely hard work, and about 85 percent of sampled respondents had left their 
jobs due to their inability to continue such arduous work. They also found that about 75 
percent of current and 90 percent of former drivers mentioned “physical exhaustion” and 
“fatigue” when discussing rickshaw pulling. 
According to the New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1993), “rickshaw” originated 
from the Japanese word Jinrikisha, which literally means “human-powered vehicle”. 
During the 1860s, rickshaws were first made in Japan (Saito, 1979). Rajvanshi (2002) 
explained that rickshaws were used as a means of transportation for the social elite; 
however, they still play an important role in the transportation system, particularly in 
third-world countries. Hakim and Rahman (2016); Kamruzzaman and Hakim (2015); and 
Hakim and Talukder (2016) showed that RPs are among the most disadvantaged 
segments of the population. 
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Rickshaw is one of the most important means of transportation in Bangladesh. 
Almost all the RPs in Dhaka come from the rural areas of Bangladesh, since they do not 
get work in the villages. Though driving a rickshaw is a hard job, their income is 
inadequate to support their families. They don’t get proper medical treatment. Though a 
rickshaw is a non-motorized and environmentally friendly means of transportation, 
continuous driving for many years takes a huge toll on RPs’ physical ability (Begum & 
Sen, 2005). 
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) of US$747.34 in 2012 (World Health Organization, 2013). The 
per capita income of the RP community was $260.12 in 2013 (Table 3.1), which falls 
well below the threshold of $693.50 in a year, which is defined as extreme poverty 
(World Bank, 2016).6 Per capita total health expenditure in Bangladesh was US$67 in 
2011 (World Health Organization, 2011) and $14.84 in 2013 for the RP community 
(Table 3.1). As one of the lower-middle–income countries, and with a population of 160 
million (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2016; July 2014 estimate), Bangladesh has been 
struggling to improve its population’s health for long time. On average, households in 
Bangladesh spend 11 percent of their total household budget on health (Rahman, 
Gilmour, Saito, Sultana, & Shibuya, 2013), whereas households in the RP community 
spend about 5.7 percent (Table 3.1). 
In their study on RPs in rural Bangladesh, Islam, Hakim, Safeuzzaman, Hague, 
and Alam (2016) showed that 72 percent of respondents earned about $4–5 and only 6 
                                                 
6 The World Bank (2016) defines “extreme poverty” as living on less than $1.90 per person per day. Based 
on this information, the per capita annual income of an extremely poor person is below $693.50 
(= $1.90*365). 
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percent earned about $6 on a daily basis. They also found that 22 percent of respondents 
were underweight, about 28 percent had a cough and cold, 18 percent had diarrhea, and 
10 percent had asthma and gastric ulcers. 
 In my survey of RPs, respondents were asked about various aspects of healthcare 
received over the last year and about illness and demographic information of household 
members, such as age and years of schooling of the household head, family size, duration 
of the illness episode, distance of the residence from the healthcare facility/hospital, etc. 
Using this survey, the paper employs a flexible Box-Cox model regression method to find 
the determinants of healthcare expenditure for a resource-constrained community. The 
results suggest that households’ annual income, distance of residence from healthcare 
center/hospital, age of the household head, duration of illness episode, years of schooling, 
family size, and marital status affect healthcare expenditure. The income elasticity of 
healthcare expenditure of about 0.55 implies that healthcare is a necessary good. This 
study is unique in its analysis of the determinants of healthcare expenditure of the 
working-class population, using cross-sectional microdata. The specific research 
questions are: 
i. What are the impacts of duration of illness episode in the households of a 
resource-constrained community on their healthcare spending? 
ii. Which individual household determinants, such as annual income, distance, 
education, family size, and marital status, best explain household healthcare 
expenditure? 
iii. Does the age of the household head play any role in the household’s 
healthcare spending in a resource-limited community? 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
literature review; section 3 discusses the methodology of the study, which explores the 
sources of data and the methods followed; section 4 portrays the descriptive analysis for 
the core sample; section 5 analyzes the results; and section 6 puts forward conclusions. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2000) portrayed that the healthcare OOP expenditure of 
most low- and middle-income Asian countries was regressive, as social assistance and fee 
exemptions were either non-existent or, where they existed, were not well targeted at 
those who were most in need. Using household survey data from 11 Asian countries, Van 
Doorslaer et al. (2006) showed that OOP payments are the key source of healthcare 
financing, and the ratio of OOP payments to total household healthcare expenditure is 
between 30 and 82 percent. They also found that the overall prevalence of absolute 
poverty in 11 Southeast Asian countries is 14 percent higher than conventional estimates 
of poverty that do not consider OOP payments for healthcare. In addition, they portrayed 
that Vietnam, India, China, and Bangladesh depend to a great degree on OOP healthcare 
spending, so experiencing an extensive catastrophic payment leads directly to poverty. 
Su, Pokhrel, Gbangou, and Flessa (2006) presented that demographic 
characteristics and severity of illness play an important role in healthcare expenditure. 
Akanda and Minowa (2011) underlined the importance of analyses of demand for 
healthcare and healthcare expenditure at the household level for effective health policy 
formulation. They argued that efficient community- and country-bound health policy 
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cannot be designed without adequate information on household healthcare expenditure, 
especially for middle- and low-income countries. 
Andersen (2016) showed that the presence of illness is the most obvious factor 
that determines households’ OOP healthcare spending, while need is a perceived 
phenomenon. Barros (1998); Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); Roberts (2000); Karatzas 
(2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Clemente, Marcuiello, Montanes, and Pueyo (2004); 
Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Koening et al. (2003); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli, 
Filippini, and Mosca (2006); Mosca (2007); You and Kobayashi (2011); Foster (2016); 
and Molla, Chi, and Mondaca (2017) used income as one of the most important 
determinants of healthcare expenditure. 
There is little agreement regarding the value of the income elasticity of demand 
for healthcare services. Getzen (2000) showed that this elasticity varies according to the 
level of analysis (individual, regional, or aggregate) of the research. 
Newhouse (1977); Leu (1986); Brown (1987); Parkin, McGuire, and Yule (1987); 
and Gerdtham, Sogaard, Andersson, and Jonsson (1992) found that healthcare 
expenditure in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries at the aggregate level before 1998 obtained values for income elasticity greater 
than 1. Roberts (2000); Rous and Hotchkiss (2003); and Clemente et al. (2004) also 
determined an income elasticity greater than unity. But Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); 
Barros (1998); Karatzas (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Koening et al. (2003); 
Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Okunade (2005); Di Matteo (2005); and Molla et al. (2017) 
identified an income elasticity with values between 0 and 1. 
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Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); Karatzas (2000); Roberts (2000); Giannoni and 
Hitiris (2002); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli et al. (2006); You and Kobayashi (2011); Molla 
et al. (2017); and Mahumud et al. (2017) found that people spend more on healthcare 
with increasing age. 
Gertler and Gaag (1990) showed that income, prices, and travel time are the main 
determinants of healthcare expenditure. You and Kobayashi (2011) also identified that 
healthcare expenditure increases with chronic disease and residence in urban areas. 
Jochmann (2004) treated the number of doctor visits in the last 3 months as the 
dependent variable, whereas the independent variables consisted of socioeconomic 
characteristics and variables that described the health condition of the individual. They 
included a self-perceived health satisfaction index, degree of handicap in percentage 
points, relationship status, age, education, as well as variables measuring disability. They 
found that the number of doctor visits increases with age until the age of 85 and decreases 
thereafter. 
Some studies have been conducted in developing countries using cross-sectional 
data to identify determinants of healthcare expenditure. 
Sodani (1999) considered “healthcare expenditure” as the dependent variable in 
his paper on the tribal households of three selected districts of Rajasthan, India. The 
explanatory variables were “duration of illness episode,” “number of visits to source of 
care,” and “distance of source of care from the residence of households”. Howlader, 
Routh, Hossain, Saha, and Khuda (2000) found that the amount of healthcare expenditure 
varies with change in income, type of disease, and type of provider and estimated the 
elasticities of demand for healthcare using cross-sectional data that were collected using a 
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structured questionnaire administered to rural household heads in Bangladesh in 1997. 
Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) used the Nepal Living Standards Survey, a nationally 
representative sample of households from 1996, to investigate the determinants of 
household OOP health expenditures. Okunade (2005) presented econometric model 
findings of the determinants of per-capita health expenditure (at PPP) for 26 African 
countries using 1995 cross-sectional data. They found that economic and other 
determinants - per-capita GDP (at PPP), ODA (US$), Gini income inequality index, 
population dependency ratio, internal conflicts, and the percentage of births attended by 
trained medical workers - capture 74 percent of the variations in health expenditures. 
Hague and Barman (2010) used household data from Chittagong Division to research the 
factors of healthcare expenditure and showed that income has a significant effect on 
people’s choice of healthcare provider and on their amount of healthcare spending. 
Chang and Hague (2014) showed that illness, educational level, type of medical 
consultants, household characteristics, location, and wealth significantly affect the level 
of healthcare spending. Mahumud et al. (2017) and Molla et al. (2017) estimated the 
predictors of health expenditure among Bangladeshi households using the Bangladesh 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (BHIES) 2010. Mahumud et al. (2017) used 
age, marital status, education level, wealth quintile, sex, and first symptoms of illness as 
the predictors of healthcare expenditure. Molla et al. (2017) presented that household 
healthcare expenditure is determined by income, presence of health shock, presence of 
chronic illness, proportion of illiterate members in the family, household durable goods, 
family size, proportion of female members, and rural residence. 
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The studies conducted in these countries have some limitations. These studies 
mainly either used national data or were conducted in pocket areas that do not represent 
any specific community (like the working-class population). Moreover, to show a causal 
relationship, a limited number of studies have used modern econometric techniques of 
analysis. Specification is essential for the formulation of a health system financing policy 
for a community. This study uses cross-sectional microdata on resource-constrained 
households like RPs in Dhaka collected via a survey conducted in 2014. 
 Sufficient knowledge about the extent, determinants, and elasticities of healthcare 
expenditure is necessary to devise strategies to increase the allocative efficiency of 
resources, ensure the proper utilization of the existing resources, and improve the quality 
of services. Analysis of healthcare expenditure is also decisive in designing strategies 
aimed at achieving financial sustainability for a program. The findings of the study will 
be helpful in designing and executing a healthcare financing policy for households in a 
working-class community. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
 
The study is based on a sample of 120 RPs. At the time of the survey, all of them 
were living and working in Dhaka. A stratified sample was drawn at random from 
different points of the city,7 ensuring the inclusion of all age groups. Selected RPs were 
interviewed using a more detailed structure. Respondents were asked about healthcare 
expenditures and various aspects of healthcare received in 2013 by all the RPs’ 
                                                 
7 City points covered are Khilgoan (Mouchak, Modhubug, Malibug), Lalbug (Puran Dhaka, BDR 1 No. 
Gate, Beribad), Mohammadpur (Adabor, Gigatola), Jattrabari, Mirpur, and Dhanmondi areas. 
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household members. Data were collected from RP households who could choose from 
public and private providers. They usually went to low- and medium-quality registered 
private providers. Data on household annual income were also collected. Some 
information on other costs involved in receiving healthcare were available, but not in the 
required form. Though data on travel cost were available, data on travel time and waiting 
time were not available. Data on age of the RP, years of schooling, marital status, and 
distance of residence from the healthcare center and the duration of their household 
members’ illness episodes were collected. RPs were the main or only earning member of 
their households. RPs were also the household heads. 
3.3.2 Empirical Regression Model Specification 
 
Most of the studies on determinants of OOP healthcare expenditure in developing 
countries have used ordinary least square (OLS) methods as econometric techniques. 
Malik and Syed (2012) used the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) and the 
Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement (PSLM) Survey for the years 2004–05 to find 
socioeconomic determinants of household OOP payments for healthcare in Pakistan. 
Vasudeva and Okunade (2009) applied OLS and robust least absolute error (LAE) 
estimation methods to estimate the core determinants of health expenditure using data 
from 44 African countries for the year 2001. Molla et al. (2017) and Mahumud et al. 
(2017) also applied OLS to estimate the predictors of health expenditure among 
Bangladeshi households using the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (BHIES) 2010. Mosca (2007) formulated a log-log in which he estimated the total 
healthcare expenditure per capita (THE) by OLS with a sample of 20 countries in the 
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OECD for which sufficient information was available from 1990–2000. Hague and 
Barman (2010) attempted to find out the determinants of household healthcare 
expenditure using a multi-equation recursive estimation procedure. First, they used a 
binary logit model to estimate the probability of being ill, which was then used as an 
independent variable in the second stage logit model for provider choice. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates were obtained for the parameters of the healthcare expenditure 
model in the third stage. Mugisha, Kouyata, Gbangou, and Sauerborn (2002) used a Tobit 
model to examine OOP expenditure on healthcare in Nouna, Burkina Faso. However, 
Rous and Hotchkiss (2003) recommended that a Tobit model should be applied carefully 
in the case of health expenditure. They developed a full information maximum likelihood 
model to control the endogeneity of sickness and provider choice using data from Nepal. 
Hjortsberg (2003) used data from Zambia and validated the method to control 
endogeneity bias by generating a selection term as a regressor in OLS estimation of 
healthcare expenditure for corresponding providers. 
I am going to use a Box-Cox transformation model (Box & Cox, 1964) to identify 
the determinants of healthcare expenditure for a resource-constrained community using 
cross-sectional microdata. The Box-Cox transformation model has been applied in 
various economic applications. Examples include price changes (Millon, Gressel, & 
Mulkey, 1984), demand and supply elasticities (Bessler et al., 1984), money demand 
(Boylan & O’Muircheartaigh, 1981; Mills, 1978; Spitzer, 1976; White, 1972; Zarembka, 
1968), hedonic price models (Blackley, Follain, & Ondrich, 1984; Megbolugbe, 1986), 
exports (Davison, Arnade, & Hallahan, 1989; Miner, 1982), and import demand 
(Blaylock & Smallwood, 1985; Boylan, Cuddy, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1980, 1982; 
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Hwang, 1981; Khan & Ross, 1977); other examples include Granger and Newbold 
(1976), Hopwood, McKeown, and Newbold (1984), Smyth and Dua (1986), Guerrero 
(1987), and Montmarquette and Blais (1987). 
Box-Cox transformation models are useful for minimizing functional form bias, 
since the commonly assumed linear and log-log forms in expenditure models are nested 
in the generalized flexible power family of the transformation model. Gerdtham, Sogaard, 
Jonsson, and Andersson (1991) used this method in their OECD health expenditure 
model, choosing the quadratic square root transformation as the best. Okunade (1985) 
earlier tested a different set of functional forms - linear, linear-log, log-linear, and log-log 
for selecting the best-fitting model for the 1960–72 data of each African country. 
Gbesemete and Gerdtham (1992) selected a log-log model based on the RESET model 
selection criterion rather than the Box-Cox power tests using 1984 data from Africa. 
Okunade (2005) showed the results of the determinants of per-capita health expenditure 
for 26 African countries using 1995 cross-sectional data and flexible Box-Cox model 
regression methods. 
The multiple regression model, specifying values of the dependent variable h to 
depend on values of a set of regressors m, takes the general form 
h = f (m, γ )                                                                                                                    (3.1) 
where the data column vector hi (i = 1, 2, . . ., k) ∈ matrix m (with a column of 1s for the 
intercept), each mi is orthogonal to the other mi s (data columns of the regressors making 
up the design matrix), and the model residuals ε are normally distributed with 0 means 
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and a finite variance σ2. The regression parameter estimates of γi (∈ vector γ) captures the 
slope 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑚𝑖
 . 
Health expenditure data are typically not normally distributed (Tuckman, Chang, 
& Okunade, 1999), and cross-sectional data model residuals are usually not 
homoscedastic. Consequently, as in Carroll and Ruppert (1988), healthcare expenditure 
data in this study can be optimally modeled by either assuming that h (skewed response 
data) is capable of transformation to symmetry using the generalized flexible Box-Cox 
power family of data transformations model or by specifying ε, the density of the model 
residuals, as belonging to a class of skewed densities. The first method produces 
maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the regression model gradients (γ in equation 
(3.1)) conditional on standard deviation (σ) and scalar power estimates (λ) that are 
generally consistent with the observed dataset. On the other hand, the second approach is 
a generalized linear model (GLM). I discuss the first estimation method here. 
The generalized flexible, or fully flexible, fairly parametrically rich Box-Cox 
transformation model (BCTM) is as follows in case of our healthcare expenditure 
analysis: 
ℎ𝜆 =
ℎ𝜆−1
𝜆
                                                                                                                       (3.2) 
where h is the total healthcare expenditure and λ is a scalar parameter that is jointly 
estimated with other parameters of the regression model. The transformation could make 
the residuals more closely normal and less heteroskedastic (Box & Cox, 1964). The 
transform embeds several functional forms (Cook & Weisberg, 1982) admitting 
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transformation of strictly positive data values for a continuous variable h, which takes the 
form 
h(λ)   =   h – 1   if λ = 1 
            ln(h)    if λ = 0                                                                                                     (3.3) 
             1 –  
1
ℎ
  if λ = -1 
The power family of the transformation model, also skew-correcting for the 
dependent variable h, will be applied to the left- and right-hand-side variables (excluding 
the dummy variable), to permit different λ power transformations of each variable in the 
healthcare expenditure model. I can fit the following Box-Cox models for our healthcare 
expenditure study and obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for 
different models (Drukker, 2000). 
Theta model 
hj
(θ)  =  γ0  +  γ1 m
(λ)
1j + γ2 m
(λ)
2j  + . . . +  γk m
(λ)
kj  + α1 n1j  +  α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj  +  εj            (3.4) 
where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, is subject to a Box-Cox 
transformation with the parameter θ. Each of the independent variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk, 
is transformed by a Box-Cox transform with parameter λ. The independent variables 
(e.g., dummy variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl, are not transformed. 
Lambda model 
hj
(λ)  =  γ0  +  γ1 m
(λ)
1j + γ2 m
(λ)
2j  + . . . +  γk m
(λ)
kj  + α1 n1j  +  α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj  +  εj          (3.5) 
where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, and each of the independent 
variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk, are transformed by a Box-Cox transformation with the 
common parameter λ. The independent variables (e.g., dummy variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl, 
are not transformed. 
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Left-hand-side–only model 
hj
(λ) =  γ0  +  γ1 m1j + γ2 m2j  + . . . +  γk mkj +  εj                                                                    (3.6) 
where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Here, the dependent variable, h, is subject to a Box-Cox 
transformation with the parameter λ. 
Right-hand-side–only model 
hj  =  γ0  +  γ1 m
(λ)
1j + γ2 m
(λ)
2j  + . . . +  γk m
(λ)
kj  + α1 n1j  +  α2 n2j + . . . + αl nlj  +  εj            (3.7) 
where ε ~ N (0, σ2). Each of the independent variables, m1, m2, . . ., mk, is transformed by 
a Box-Cox transformation with parameter λ. The independent variables (e.g., dummy 
variables), n1, n2, . . ., nl, are not transformed. 
Estimation of likelihood function for different models 
In the internal computations, 
ℎ𝜆 =
ℎ𝜆−1
𝜆
  for all λ >0 
                 ln(h) otherwise 
The unconcentrated log likelihood for the theta model is 
ln L = (- 
𝐼
2
) ln { (2𝜋)  +    ln (𝜎2)} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑ ln(ℎ𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1 − (
1
2𝜎2
)  SSR 
where SSR = sum of squared residuals 
=  ∑ (ℎ(𝜃) − 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑚𝑖1
(𝜆) + 𝛾2𝑚𝑖2
(𝜆) + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑘𝑚𝑗𝑘
(𝜆) + 𝛼1𝑛𝑖1 + 𝛾𝛼2𝑛𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑗𝑙  )
𝐼
𝑖=1
2
 
Writing the SSR in matrix form, 
SSR = ( h(θ)  - M(λ)d′ - Nq′ )′ ( h(θ)  - M(λ)d′ - Nq′ ) 
where h(θ) is an I × 1 vector of elementwise transformed data, M(λ) is an I × k matrix of 
elementwise transformed data, N is an I × l matrix of untransformed data, d is a 1 × k 
vector of coefficients, and q is a 1 × l vector of coefficients. 
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Let 
Zλ = ( M
(λ)   N ) 
be the horizontal concatenation of M(λ) and N and 
 𝑣′ = (
𝑑′
𝑞′
) 
be the vertical concatenation of the coefficients’ yields 
SSR = ( h(θ)  - Zλ v′ )′ ( h
(θ)  - Zλ v′ ) 
For given values of λ and θ, the solutions for v′ and 𝜎2 are 
v*′ = ( Z′λZλ)
-1 Z′λh
(θ)
 
and 
𝜎∗2 =  ( 
𝐼
2
) ( h(θ)  - Zλ v*′ )′ ( h
(θ)  - Zλ v*′ ) 
Substituting these solutions into the log-likelihood function yields the concentrated log-
likelihood function: 
ln Lc = (- 
𝐼
2
) ln { (2𝜋)  + 1 +   ln (𝜎 ∗2)} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑ ln(ℎ𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1  
Similar calculations yield the concentrated log-likelihood function for the lambda model: 
ln Lc = (- 
𝐼
2
) ln { (2𝜋)  + 1 +   ln (𝜎 ∗2)} + (𝜆 − 1) ∑ ln(ℎ𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1  
For the left-hand-side–only model: 
ln Lc = (- 
𝐼
2
) ln { (2𝜋)  + 1 +   ln (𝜎 ∗2)} + (𝜃 − 1) ∑ ln(ℎ𝑖)𝐼𝑖=1  
For the right-side–only model: 
ln Lc = (- 
𝐼
2
) ln { (2𝜋)  + 1 +   ln (𝜎 ∗2)} 
where 𝜎∗2 is specific to each model and is defined analogously to that in the theta model. 
 The chi-square (χ2) likelihood ratio test statistic, applied to the log-likelihood 
function values of the BCTM versus each of the restricted regression models, is used to 
guide selection of the optimal functional form from among the parametrically more 
restrictive competing models (linear-linear, linear-log, log-linear, log-log) that are nested 
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in my more general BCTM specification. The research goal of the BCTM model is to fit 
the appropriate functional form model to the observed data in order to reduce the 
specification bias that could arise from the fitting the a priori restrictive functional form 
models. 
 The expected relationship of each determinant to healthcare expenditure (HCEX) 
in a BCTM regression model estimation of the type ℎ(𝜆0) = 𝑚(𝜆1)γ  + ε, where γ is the 
slope vector, h is HCEX, m is matrix of independent variables, and ε is the residual 
vector, is as follows: 
(HCEX)(𝜆) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (LINC)
(𝜆1)+ 𝛾2 (DIST)
(𝜆2) + 𝛾3 (AGE)
(𝜆3)  + 𝛾4 (DOIE)
(𝜆4)   
+ 𝛾5 (FS)
(𝜆5)+ 𝛾6 (YSHH)
(𝜆6)+ 𝛼1 (MSHH)  + ε                                                           (3.8) 
where, in accordance with a priori theoretical expectations, 
 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝛾4, 𝛾5, 𝛾6, 𝛼1 > 0. 
The dependent variable: 
HCEX = healthcare expenditure of household 
Explanatory variables: 
LINC = annual income (last-year income) 
DIST = distance of residence from healthcare center/hospital 
AGE = age of household head 
DOIE = duration of illness episode 
FS = family size 
YSHH = years of schooling of household head 
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Dummy variable:  
MSHH = marital status of household head, MSHH = 1 if married; MSHH = 0 if 
unmarried 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 3.1 shows that the mean age of household head (RP) was about 36 years. 
The average number of years of schooling was about 3 years. Most of the sample RPs 
were married (85 percent). Only about 22 percent of RPs owned their rickshaws, and the 
rest of the RPs rented their rickshaws on a daily basis. The average number of family 
members in an RP household was about 5. The number of income earners in each 
household was about 2. The average annual income of RP households was $1,227 (BDT 
95,406). An RP held $1,826 (BDT 141,968) in wealth on an average. The mean savings 
of an RP household was $54 (BDT 4,228). Average debt was $63 (BDT 4,892). The 
average net savings was $-5.50 (BDT -664). The average RP household was sick 47 days 
in the last year. The mean number of days the household members stayed in the hospital 
was 5, and they were absent from work about 24 days in the last year. They lost about 
$158 (BDT 122.79) in the last year due to illness. About 87 percent of RP households 
receive modern healthcare (registered physician and modern medical facilities). The 
mean number of visits to the health center was about 7. The average distance from the 
healthcare center was 2.63 kilometers. The user fee per visit was $0.90 (BDT 70). The 
travel cost per visit was $0.38 (BDT 30). Medicine cost per visit was $5 (BDT 397). 
About 74 percent of RP households were satisfied with the quality of healthcare, and 65 
percent of the RP households were pleased with the health service they received from the 
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healthcare center. About 84 percent of them were willing to pay for healthcare when they 
became ill. About 85 percent of them took addictive substances, on which they spent 
about $0.30 (BDT 23) each day. Average expenditure for total healthcare in an RP 
household was $70 (BDT 5,408). The per capita total expenditure for healthcare last year 
was $14.84 (BDT 1146). The share of household budget spent on healthcare was 5.70 
percent. Please visit the appendix (Tables A 3.1–A 3.8) for the distribution of different 
variables. 
3.5 Results 
 
I discussed four different Box-Cox models in section 3. Table 3.2 presents a Box-
Cox model estimates based on prior studies (Bessler et al., 1984; Blackley et al., 1984; 
Blaylock & Smallwood, 1985; Boylan & O’Muircheartaigh, 1981; Boylan et al., 1980, 
1982; Davison et al., 1989; Gerdtham et al., 1991; Granger & Newbold, 1976; Guerrero, 
1987; Hopwood et al., 1984; Hwang, 1981; Khan & Ross, 1977; Megbolugbe, 1986; 
Millon et al., 1984; Mills, 1978; Miner, 1982; Montmarquette & Blais, 1987; Okunade, 
2005; Smyth & Dua, 1986; Spitzer, 1976; White, 1972; Zarembka, 1968). I used the 
lambda model in my analysis to explain the determinants of healthcare expenditure of a 
resource-constrained community. Regression estimates used OOP healthcare expenditure 
as the dependent variable. The p-values are in parentheses. 
Results of the lambda model are presented in Column I of Table 3.2. I found the 
signs of the coefficients as expected except age of the household head. The coefficients 
of annual income and age of the household head are significant at the 10 percent level. 
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The duration of illness episode is significant at the 1 percent level, and the distance of the 
residence from the healthcare center/hospital is significant at the 11 percent level. 
The income elasticity of healthcare is 0.547 and significant, implying that 
healthcare is a normal and necessary good for the resource-constrained community of 
rickshaw pullers. It shows that a 10 percent increase in income level leads to a 5.4 percent 
increase in household healthcare expenditure. This result is supported by Di Matteo and 
Di Matteo (1998); Barros (1998); Karatzas (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Koening 
et al. (2003); Herwartz and Theilen (2003); Okunade (2005); Di Matteo (2005); and 
Molla et al. (2017). They found income elasticity for healthcare, with values between 0 
and 1. Rickshaw pulling is a laborious occupation that requires physical fitness. If RPs 
become sick, they do not have any other means of earning. This gives rickshaw pullers 
the motivation to visit doctors when sick. 
The coefficient of the distance of the household’s residence from the healthcare 
center/hospital shows that a 10 percent increase in distance leads to a 7.6 percent increase 
in household healthcare expenditure. Sodani (1999) also showed that “distance of source 
of care from” can explain the healthcare expenditure increase in the rural and urban areas 
of three districts of Rajasthan, India. 
The age coefficient shows that healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with 
age, and a 10 percent increase in an RP’s age leads to a 24.5 percent decrease in 
household healthcare expenditure. This is supported by Begum and Sen (2004). They 
explained that driving a rickshaw on a regular basis is hard work, and after the age of 50, 
it is difficult to drive throughout the entire week, so drivers tended to drive 3 to 4 days a 
week, which may cause a decrease in their daily income. This drop in income causes a 
80 
 
decrease in their healthcare expenditure, since the number of dependents in a household 
increases as the head grows older, requiring him to redistribute his healthcare expenditure 
toward food and other consumption items. However, Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998); 
Karatzas (2000); Roberts (2000); Giannoni and Hitiris (2002); Di Matteo (2005); Crivelli 
et al. (2006); You and Kobayashi (2011); Molla et al. (2017); and Mahumud et al. (2017) 
observed that people spent more on healthcare with increasing age. This implies that the 
healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with age of the household head in a 
resource-constrained community and positively associated for others. 
The coefficient of duration of illness episode shows that OOP healthcare 
expenditure is positively associated with the number of sick days of the household 
members, and a 10 percent increase in duration of illness leads to a 12.6 percent increase 
in expenditure on health. Sodani (1999) also found a similar direction of the coefficient. 
The coefficient of years of schooling of the household head implies that a 
household head with a greater number of schooling years spends more on healthcare for 
his household than a household head with fewer schooling years, holding all other 
variables constant. The RPs with less education either chose alternative or home remedies 
or were not as well informed about the accessibility of healthcare. Jochmann and Leon-
Gonzalez (2004); Hague and Barman (2010); Chang and Hague (2014); Mahumud et al. 
(2017); and Molla et al. (2017) also observed a similar direction of the coefficient. 
Moreover, the RPs were born and raised in poor families and must start earning from 
their childhood or help parents in their household activities instead of going to school. 
The RPs had on average fewer than 3 years of schooling (Table 3.1). Therefore, level of 
education affected their healthcare expenditure, but not significantly. However, these 
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findings have been checked with other regression equations and observed to be in the 
same direction of the coefficient. 
Like Molla et al. (2017), I also find that there is a positive association between 
healthcare expenditure and the size of a family. The result shows that a 10 percent 
increase in number of family members leads to a 13.6 percent increase in household 
healthcare expenditure. 
The result shows that households with married household heads (RPs) spent more 
on healthcare than households with unmarried RPs, holding all other variables 
unchanged. Mahumud et al. (2017) supports this finding. 
The robustness results of the lambda model are presented in Table 3.3. Column 
VII of Table 3.3 shows that a 10 percent increase in number of the dependent family 
members leads to an 11.5 percent decrease in healthcare expenditure. Okunade (2005) 
observed the same direction of the coefficient for the variable dependency ratio in his 
study. All the coefficients of the equations in Table 3.3 show the same direction of the 
coefficient as in the previous study. Income, distance, age of the household head, and 
duration of illness episode variables are significant in all the regression equations. 
To compare the lambda model with other versions of the Box-Cox model, I report 
the left-hand-side–only model and right-hand-side–only model in brief. I do not report 
the other version of the Box-Cox model, the theta model.8 The results of the left-hand-
side–only model and right-hand-side–only model are presented in Table 3.2. Column II 
presents the results of the left-hand-side–only model. The result shows that healthcare 
expenditure is inversely associated with the marital status of the household head. But 
                                                 
8 The theta model did not converge to have definite estimates. 
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based on the prior study, I expected that healthcare expenditure would be positively 
related to marital status. The value of the income coefficient is too small to explain. No 
other coefficient is significant in this model. Column III shows the results of right-hand-
side–only model. I expected healthcare expenditure to have a positive association with 
years of schooling. However, the result shows that they are inversely associated. Though 
the coefficient of the age of household and the duration of illness episode are significant, 
other explanatory variables are not statistically significant. The robustness tests of the 
left-hand-side–only model and right-hand-side–only model are presented in Tables 3.4 
and 3.5, respectively. 
3.6 Summary, Conclusions, and Implications 
 
This study examined a Box-Cox econometric model of the determinants of health 
expenditure in a resource-constrained community using cross-sectional microdata on 
rickshaw pullers, who represent the working-class population. 
The results of the study show that annual household income, distance of residence 
from a healthcare center/hospital, age of the household head, duration of illness episode, 
years of schooling, family size, and marital status are the main factors of total healthcare 
expenditure among resource-constrained households. I found that healthcare expenditure 
is positively associated with household income level, distance of residence from 
healthcare center/hospital, duration of illness episode, years of schooling of the 
household head, family size, and marital status, as expected; these associations are 
supported by previous studies. However, healthcare expenditure is inversely associated 
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with age of the household head; this association in case of a resource-constrained 
community is opposite of the existing literature.  
The income elasticity of about 0.55 signals the tendency for healthcare to behave 
like a normal and necessary good. Since healthcare is a necessity in the “basic needs” 
theory of economic development, the way healthcare expenditure in a resource-
constrained community responds to changes in income level and other factors is 
particularly relevant to development policy. Working-class populations in developing 
countries have unmet healthcare needs, and effective policies and programs are needed to 
ensure that healthcare services are received in a timely manner.   
The distance of a household’s residence from the healthcare center/hospital and 
the duration of an illness episode also play significant roles in determining healthcare 
expenditure. The results show that a 10 percent increase in the distance leads to a 7.6 
percent increase in household healthcare expenditure, and a 10 percent increase in 
duration of illness leads to a 12.6 percent increase in expenditure on health. Moreover, a 
10 percent increase in the number of family members leads to a 13.6 percent increase in 
household healthcare expenditure. 
The finding shows that healthcare expenditure is inversely associated with the age 
of the household head. It may happen in a resource-constrained community because the 
earning ability (income level) of day laborers decreases as their age increases. The 
situation is aggravated when the household head has an accident or experiences severe 
sickness. Moreover, the number of dependents in the household increases as the head 
becomes older, requiring redistribution of healthcare expenses toward food and other 
consumption items.  
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This study can help policymakers design extensive and effective financial 
protection mechanisms for the resource-constrained community by finding the predictors 
of healthcare expenditure. Though the current study shows that healthcare is a necessary 
good, OOP payments are not an equitable or efficient financing mechanism. Resource-
constrained, hardworking poor citizens do not receive the high-quality healthcare services 
they need, and their standard of living is less than that of other city dwellers. Extensive 
safety net programs need to be designed and implemented for resource-constrained 
communities. The quality of healthcare received by this group of households and its 
availability should be ensured. Precise policy and management improvements in pursuit 
of better quality and more equitable distribution of resources in the health sector must be 
undertaken to provide health services to this group of population. Universal healthcare 
coverage for this group of households should be guaranteed. Governments of different 
countries need to reinforce existing healthcare programs, and additionally, they should 
introduce effective new types of safety net for the working-class population in old age, 
especially if the households have no other earning member. Policymakers can spread 
their family planning/birth control services more effectively to the doors of such 
communities to keep the family size small. A specialized bank for the resource-
constrained community can be introduced to provide small and medium enterprise loans 
with low interest rates and insurance policies to cover the loss of injury (Bose, 2014). As 
per Molla et al. (2017), alternative revenue generation and allocation of resources to 
cover the health needs of resource-constrained households need to be revisited. For 
instance, exempting this group of households from fees could reduce their OOP 
healthcare expenditure and financial burden. This study advocates that countries need to 
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reform their health system financing structures so that the resource-constrained 
community can meet their unmet healthcare needs. 
In future research, the sample size might be increased to derive the healthcare 
expenditure function for a larger population. The survey could not be conducted widely 
because of some limitations (e.g., financial and time constraints). On occasion, the 
respondents did not assist adequately. Moreover, conducting interviews involved several 
safety concerns during evening hours when RPs were available at home. There is a scope 
to conduct extensive research by increasing the sample size of the RPs covering the 
whole of Bangladesh and other countries so that effective policy measures may be taken 
to improve the health status of a marginalized, poor segment of society. In addition, 
future research on health spending among the working-class population might consider 
other resource-constrained communities with different occupations. 
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TABLES 
Table 3. 1 Descriptive Statistics for Core Sample. 
Variable Mean (BDT) USD($)9 N 
Age of RP 36.358 (11.349)  120 
Years of schooling of RP 2.967 (2.719)  120 
Marital status 0.850 (0.358)  120 
Ownership of rickshaw 0.217 (0.413)  120 
Number of family members of RP 4.717 (1.557)  120 
Number of income earners in RP’s 
household 
1.717 (0.842)  120 
Household annual income 95,406.5 (43,974.67) 1,227 120 
Per capita income (household annual 
income/ average number of family 
members of RP) 
20,226.10 260.12 120 
Household wealth 141,968.3 (388745.9) 1,826 120 
Household savings 4,228.042 (11100.14) 54 120 
Household debt 4,891.667 (10148.31) 63 120 
Household net savings -663.625 (14769.63) - 5.5 120 
Household sick days last year 46.792 (89.194)  120 
Number of days stayed in hospital 4.908 (13.074)  120 
Number of days absent from work due to 
illness 
23.858 (38.375)  120 
Income lost due to last year illness  12,279.5 (51,008.7) 158 120 
Received modern healthcare 0.867 (0.341)  120 
Note: Standard deviations indicated in parentheses.  
 
                                                 
9 Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of 
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php. 
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka. 
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Table 3.1  Continued 
Variable Mean (BDT) USD($)10 N 
Number of visits to healthcare center last 
year 
7.025 (9.585)  120 
Distance from healthcare 
center/hospital(km) 
2.630 (3.948)  120 
User fee per visit 69.842 (90.555) 0.90 120 
Travel cost per visit 29.892 (41.796) 0.38 120 
Medicine cost per visit 396.667 (861.474) 5 120 
Quality of healthcare if satisfactory 0.742 (0.440)  120 
Quality of health service if satisfactory 0.650 (0.479)  120 
Willingness to pay for healthcare 0.842 (0.366)  120 
Whether any family member takes 
addictive substances 
0.85 (0.358)  120 
Money spent on addiction per day 22.925 (21.127) 0.30 120 
Total expenditure for healthcare last year 5,407.842 (24787.59) 70 120 
Per capita total expenditure for healthcare 
last year* (total expenditure for healthcare 
last year/ average number of family 
members of RP) 
1,146.46 14.84 120 
Share of household budget spent on 
healthcare (total expenditure for healthcare 
last year /household annual income) 
 5.70 % 120 
Note: Standard deviations indicated in parentheses. *The World Bank (2016) defines “extreme poverty” as 
living on less than $1.90 per person per day. Based on this information, the annual income of an extremely 
poor person is less than $693.50 (= $1.90*365), so a rickshaw puller’s household falls into this category. 
 
                                                 
10 Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of 
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php. 
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka. 
88 
 
Table 3. 2 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure 
Model (λ* ≅ 0) 
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure 
Box-Cox regression                                                   Estimator 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Different Box-Cox models 
 
Lambda model Left-hand-side–
only model 
Right-hand-side–
only model 
Household’s annual 
income 
0.547* 
(0.060) 
0.0000* 
(0.054) 
 
1,912 
(0.526) 
Distance of residence from 
healthcare center/hospital 
0.758 
(0.119) 
0.195 
(0.159) 
2,479 
(0.297) 
Age of household head -2.454* 
(0.072)  
-0.068 
(0.260) 
-1,316* 
(0.098) 
 
Duration of illness episode 1.258*** 
(0.000)  
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
2,445** 
(0.062) 
 
Years of schooling of 
household head 
0.135 
(0.803)  
0.102 
(0.609) 
1,304 
(0.616) 
 
Family size 1.360 
(0.335)  
0.211 
(0.596) 
9,981 
(0.154) 
 
Marital status 
 
0.563 
(0.763) 
-0.927 
(0.624) 
 
11,705 
(0.163) 
N 120 120 120 
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 3. 3 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model 
(lambda model) (λ* ≅ 0) 
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure 
    Box-Cox regression                 Lambda model                                     Estimator 
Independent 
variables 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Household’s 
annual income  
0.718** 
(0.023) 
 
0.714** 
(0.028) 
0.714** 
(0.027) 
0.606** 
(0.030) 
0.605** 
(0.030) 
0.531* 
(0.064) 
0.468 
(0.144) 
Distance of 
residence from 
healthcare 
center/hospital 
  
 1.060** 
(0.046) 
1.032** 
(0.049) 
0.743 
(0.125) 
0.743 
(0.125) 
0.750 
(0.123) 
0.724 
(0.137) 
Age of 
household head 
  -1.381 
(0.215) 
-1.967* 
(0.053) 
-1.955* 
(0.057) 
-2.196** 
(0.038) 
-2.601* 
(0.060) 
 
Duration of 
illness episode 
   1.264*** 
(0.000) 
1.263*** 
(0.000) 
1.249*** 
(0.000) 
1.265*** 
(0.000) 
 
Years of 
schooling of 
household head 
  
    0.043 
(0.936) 
0.110 
(0.837) 
0.103 
(0.849) 
 
Family size      1.202 
(0.358) 
2.874 
(0.312) 
 
Marital status 
 
      0.933 
(0.633) 
 
Number of 
dependents in 
the household11 
      -1.146 
(0.538) 
 
 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
  
  
                                                 
11 The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning 
members in the household. 
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Table 3. 4 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model 
(left-hand-side–only model) (λ* ≅ 0) 
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure  
Box-Cox regression                 Left-hand-side–only model                                Estimator 
Independent 
variables 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Household’s 
annual income 
0.000** 
(0.014) 
 
0.000** 
(0.019) 
0.000** 
(0.021) 
0.000** 
(0.016) 
0.000** 
(0.017) 
0.000** 
(0.040) 
0.00* 
(0.089) 
Distance of 
resident from 
healthcare 
center/hospital 
  
 0.274** 
(0.043) 
0.278** 
(0.039) 
0.187 
(0.173) 
0.193 
(0.163) 
0.194 
(0.161) 
0.196 
(0.163) 
Age of 
household head 
  -0.045 
(0.327) 
-0.077 
(0.103) 
-0.075 
(0.118) 
-0.085* 
(0.088) 
-0.068 
(0.266) 
 
Duration of 
illness episode 
   0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
 
Years of 
schooling of 
household head 
  
    0.088 
(0.652) 
0.113 
(0.570) 
0.102 
(0.609) 
 
Family size      0.279 
(0.455) 
0.192 
(0.820) 
 
Marital status 
 
      -0.939 
(0.629) 
 
Number of 
dependents in 
the household12 
      0.022 
(0.980) 
 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120   120 
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
  
                                                 
12 The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning 
members in the household. 
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Table 3. 5 Box-Cox Regression Estimates of the Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Expenditure Model 
(right-hand-side–only model) (λ* ≅ 0) 
Dependent variable: Healthcare expenditure 
Box-Cox regression               Right-hand-side–only model                            Estimator 
Independent 
variables 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Household’s 
annual income 
116,275 
(0.773) 
 
17,347 
(0.447)  
17,044 
(0.448) 
2,054 
(0.520) 
2,521 
(0.507) 
1,398 
(0.702) 
1,433 
(0.403) 
Distance of 
resident from 
healthcare 
center/hospital 
  
 3,152 
(0.235) 
3,093 
(0.244) 
2,264 
(0.343) 
2,346 
(0.334) 
2,333 
(0.334) 
2,419 
(0.284) 
Age of 
household head 
  -5,649 
(0.614) 
-4,088 
(0.506) 
-5,113 
(0.435) 
-6,547 
(0.320) 
-10,046 
(0.124) 
 
Duration of 
illness episode 
   23,332* 
(0.078) 
2,506* 
(0.071) 
2,341* 
(0.087) 
2,027** 
(0.063) 
 
Years of 
schooling of 
household head 
  
    -2,266 
(0.391) 
-1,914 
(0.469) 
-1,067 
(0.665) 
 
Family size      6,501 
(0.332) 
1,831 
(0.891) 
 
Marital status 
 
      9,913 
(0.124) 
 
Number of 
dependents in 
the household13 
      5,511 
(0.526) 
 
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
  
                                                 
13 The number of dependents in the household is equal to the family size minus the number of earning 
members in the household. 
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APPENDIX 
       The distribution of different variables was prepared by the author based on the 
survey conducted by him. Here, Bangladeshi currency, the Taka (BDT),14 is considered 
for the calculation of income, savings, and wealth. 
  Table A 3. 1 Household Head Age Group Distribution 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
Age group (years)   
16–25 20 17 
26–35 45 37 
36–45 31 26 
46–55 17 14 
> 55 7 6 
Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
 
 Table A 3. 2 Distribution of Years of Schooling of Household Head 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
Years of schooling   
0 13 11 
1–3 62 52 
4–6 30 24.5 
7–9 9 8 
10–12 6 4.5 
Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
                                                 
14 Considering the exchange rate $1 = BDT 77.75 as of December 30, 2013, available on the website of 
Bangladesh Bank (2013), Central Bank of Bangladesh, https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/exchangerate.php. 
BDT is the code for the Bangladeshi currency, the Taka. 
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Table A 3. 3 Distribution of Average Monthly Income of Households 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
≤5,000  26 22 
5,001–7,000  27 22.5 
7,001–9,000 30 25 
9,001–11,000 15 12.5 
11,001–13,000 10 8 
>13,000 12 10 
Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
 
   Table A 3. 4 Distribution of Wealth Holding 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
0 44 36.67 
1–50,000 39 32.5 
50,001–100,000 9 7.5 
100,001–150,000 6 5 
150,001–200,000 3 2.5 
200,001–250,000 3 2.5 
250,001–300,000 0 0 
300,001–350,000 3 2.5 
>350,000 13 10.83 
          Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
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   Table A 3. 5 Distribution of Net Savings 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
-50,000 to -20,000 8 6.67 
-19,000 to -10,000 8 6.67 
-9,999 to -1 18 15 
0 47 39.2 
1 to 10,000 29 24.2 
10,001 to 20,000 4 3.33 
>20,000 6 5 
          Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
 
 Table A 3. 6 Distribution of Marital Status 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
Married 94 78 
Unmarried 26 22 
     Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
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       Table A 3. 7 Distribution of Number of Sick Days of RP Households 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
0 9 7.5 
1–30 70 58.33 
31–60 20 16.67 
61–90 10 8.33 
>90 11 9.17 
          Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
 
       Table A 3. 8 Distribution of Number of Family Members of RP Households  
Taking any Drug 
 
Parameters Frequency Percentage 
Not taking 19 15.83 
Taking 101 84.17 
          Source: Author’s calculation from the survey conducted by him. 
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